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NOTES

SUSTAINED DISSENT AND THE EXTENDED
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
Jon G. Heintz*
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2012, in American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v.
Bullock,1 the Supreme Court of the United States summarily reversed a
decision of the Montana Supreme Court, which had upheld a state
statute regulating independent political expenditures by corporations.2 In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Citizens United v. FEC3—a 2010 case which held that
independent corporate political expenditures are a form of political
speech protected by the First Amendment4—and declared that
“[t]here can be no serious doubt” that “the holding of Citizens United
applies to the Montana . . . law.”5 This, itself, is hardly noteworthy; the
Court found that petitioners failed to meaningfully distinguish the
case from Citizens United,6 and, adhering to precedent, disposed of the
case without much discussion. What is noteworthy, however, is that,
notwithstanding the per curiam reversal, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined in a dissenting opinion that went out of
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2014; B.B.A., University
of Notre Dame, 2009. I thank Professor Randy J. Kozel for his guidance, patience,
and support throughout the entire process. I also thank my family and my fellow
members of Volume 88 of the Notre Dame Law Review for their support. All errors are
my own.
1 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).
2 Id. at 2491. The statute prohibited corporations from making expenditures
“in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a
candidate or a political party.” Id.
3 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
4 See id. at 899–900.
5 Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491.
6 Id.
1939
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its way to explicitly reject the holding of Citizens United,7 despite the
existence of a factual basis upon which the dissenting Justices could
have merely distinguished the case.8 Relying on Justice Stevens’s initial dissent, Justice Breyer reiterated that there exists a substantial
body of evidence that independent corporate political expenditures
are likely to lead to fraud and corruption—a finding that directly contradicts the majority opinion in Citizens United.9 Freely admitting that
he did not have the votes to overturn the precedent, Justice Breyer
nevertheless refused to adhere to Citizens United and advocated the
Court’s reconsideration of its validity.10
Given the doctrine of stare decisis11 and the Court’s practice of
adhering to precedent,12 the fact that four Justices refused to accept
the law handed down just two years prior in Citizens United is cause for
inquiry. It is important to note that this was not an initial dissent;
those Justices with views hostile to the majority opinion in Citizens
7 Id. at 2491 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I disagree with the Court’s holding in [Citizens United] for the reasons expressed in Justice Stevens’ dissent in that case.”). Writing for all four dissenters, Justice Breyer explained that, while he would have voted to
grant certiorari to reconsider Citizens United, he did not “see a significant possibility of
reconsideration,” and therefore voted to deny cert. Id. at 2492. For further discussion of so-called “defensive denials,” see H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 198–207
(1991). “[When] a justice believes that if a case is reviewed, he will not like the outcome on the merits . . . he . . . will vote to deny” the petition for certiorari, “even if he
believes the case is certworthy, and perhaps even believes that the ruling below is a
horrible injustice . . . .” Id. at 199.
8 Justice Breyer noted that the Montana Supreme Court found that independent
corporate political expenditures did, in fact, “lead to corruption and the appearance
of corruption in Montana.” Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491–92.
9 In Citizens United, the Court concluded “that independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 130 S. Ct. at 909.
10 Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2492.
11 Latin for “to stand by things decided,” the doctrine of stare decisis commands
that “a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in
litigation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009).
12 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.” (citing Lewis F. Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 13, 16 (1991))); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 545
(1923) (“That the right to contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of the
individual protected by this clause, is settled by the decisions of this Court and is no
longer open to question.”); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 323–24 (1849) (“It becomes
necessary . . . to inquire what right a State has to impose taxes . . . . On this point I
find the doctrines held by the court so precisely and clearly laid down, that I shall do
little more than cite the language of the bench. In McCulloch v. Maryland . . . .”).
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United, including Justice Breyer, had the opportunity to dissent in that
case. And while the doctrine of stare decisis is not an absolute command,13 the factors that traditionally justify departing from stare decisis were not present in American Tradition Partnership.14 Indeed, Justice
Breyer admitted that his dissent in the latter case was based entirely
on the objections Justice Stevens raised in the prior case.15 So, given
that the question presented to the Court had already been “settled” by
Citizens United, how can the dissenters justify their refusal to accept the
rule of law that case decided?
It is possible that, in American Tradition Partnership, Justice Breyer
was planting the seeds of “sustained dissent”—described as “the practice of continually repeating resistance to a decision even years after
the decision has become law.”16 If this is true, what does it mean for
the precedential value of Citizens United? More importantly, what does
it mean for the Court as a general matter? The practice of sustaining
one’s dissent is controversial, and by no means rare,17 and raises
important questions about the nature of stare decisis and precedent,
the proper role of dissent, and the institutional legitimacy of the
Supreme Court.
Part I of this Note will describe the practice of sustained dissent,
exploring why Justices engage in it, classifying the possible justifica13 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–06 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is not . . . [an] inexorable command. . . . Whether it shall
be followed . . . is a question entirely within the discretion of the court . . . .” (quoting
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910))).
14 In Casey, the plurality stated that “a decision to overrule should rest on some
special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.” 505
U.S. at 864. The Court further enumerated the “prudential and pragmatic considerations” designed to test whether overruling prior precedent is “consisten[t] . . . with
the . . . rule of law,” including whether the precedent “def[ies] practical workability[,]
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to
the consequences of overruling,” and “whether the facts have so changed . . . as to
have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.” Id. at 854–55
(citations omitted). There was no significant evidentiary showing in American Tradition Partnership that, from 2010 to 2012, the facts used in deciding Citizens United had
“so changed” as to justify a dissent in that case.
15 See supra note 7.
16 Allison Orr Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 447, 447 (2008)
(citing Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 227 (1985)).
This practice is also referred to as “perpetual dissent,” see Larsen, supra, or “continued
dissent,” see Charles Fried, Comment, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case,
116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 185 (2002).
17 See Fried, supra note 16, at 178 (“What is not rare at all is actual persistence in
dissent.”); see also Larsen, supra note 16, at 448–49 (“[P]erpetual dissent is more the
norm these days, rather than the exception.”).
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tions for the practice, and highlighting those factors that may affect a
Justice’s decision to sustain his or her dissent. Part II will present the
skeptical view of sustained dissent—embodied in various scholarly articles which are critical of the practice—and consider the potential negative consequences those articles raise, including the potential to
harm reliance interests on the Court’s decisions and even the legitimacy of the Court as an institution. This Part will also identify the very
limited circumstances in which those scholars would tolerate sustained dissent and will examine their preferred alternative to the practice. Part III will respond to the existing literature’s criticism of the
practice by suggesting that the negative consequences raised in Part II
are unlikely to come to fruition, and that by taking an unnecessarily
harsh view of sustained dissent, critics foreclose the realization of certain benefits that may result from the practice. This Part will also
explore a potential benefit that has been heretofore unexplored—the
benefit of the extended deliberative process. Conceding that sustained dissent has perhaps become too common on the modern
Court, this Part will maintain that confining its use only to extraordinary circumstances is too extreme a solution. With this greater
insight, Part III will conclude by assessing the appropriateness of sustained dissent and will mark outer limits on one’s use of the practice
to ensure that Justices are restrained and that the practice’s costs do
not outweigh its benefits. Finally, Part IV will assume that, given the
unique dissent, American Tradition Partnership marks the beginning of
a sustained dissent from Citizens United, and will examine the appropriateness of such a decision in light of the competing theories discussed in Parts II and III.
This Note does not directly address the general practice of overruling precedent or render a judgment about when that is appropriate. While the implications and consequences of overruling and
engaging in sustained dissent overlap,18 this Note focuses on the practice of rejecting the validity of precedent and refusing to comply with
its commands when a Justice knows that such a decision will not effect
any immediate change in the rule of law. This approach is taken to
keep the scope of the Note appropriately limited.

18 See Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and Their
Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 650 (1995) (“A
sustained dissent raises jurisprudential issues inseparable from those raised by the
overruling of precedent.”).
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SUSTAINED DISSENT

Much has been written about the value of dissent generally.19
Similarly, countless scholarly works and court opinions alike have
extolled the virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis and of the Court’s
adherence to precedent.20 Typically, these values are not at odds with
one another. As Charles Fried explains, collaborative dissent—a dissent where the Justice expresses disagreement but does not question
the validity of the holding—“accords quite well with the values of stability and continuity that lie behind the doctrine of stare decisis.”21
However, when dissent is sustained in future cases, and a Justice refuses to accept a prior decision even grudgingly, it becomes much
more difficult to reconcile the virtue of dissent with the need to
adhere to precedent. This inherent tension raises the question of
whether there are other ways in which the practice of sustained dissent might be justified. Part I will describe the practice, establish a
clear definition, examine and classify the justifications for engaging in
19 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 428,
438 (1986) (observing that “dissents are . . . critical to an understanding of the [law]”
and that “[t]he right to dissent is one of the great and cherished freedoms that we
enjoy by reason of the excellent accident of our American births”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 176–82 (2003) (arguing that dissenting lower court
judges can serve as whistleblowers, “discouraging the other judges from making a
decision that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s command”); Randall T. Shepard, What Can Dissents Teach Us?, 68 ALB. L. REV. 337, 339 (2005) (observing that
dissents have “value . . . as a teaching tool for future readers” and “can . . . provide
valuable lessons about the law”). But see LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72
(1958) (expressing concern that a dissenting opinion “cancels the impact of . . . solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely depends”).
20 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Fidelity to precedent—the policy of stare decisis—is vital to the proper exercise of the judicial function.”); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare
decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”); Powell,
supra note 12, at 15–16 (identifying as the “specific merits of stare decisis” that it
lightens judicial workload, “enhances stability in the law,” and, “perhaps . . . most
important[ly],” it impacts the “public legitimacy” of the Court); Randy J. Kozel, Stare
Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 412 (2010) (“The doctrine [of
stare decisis] enjoys lofty status as the emblem of a stable judiciary.”). Even those
perceived as having a less favorable view of the doctrine still recognize its undeniable
importance to the law. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
138–39 (1997) (“Originalism . . . must accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis; it
cannot remake the world anew.”).
21 Fried, supra note 16, at 181; see also Kelman, supra note 16, at 230–31
(accepting dissent as a “legitimate and basically wholesome facet of the judicial enterprise” within a system of precedent).
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the practice, and identify those factors that might affect a Justice’s
decision whether to engage in it.
A. Defining Sustained Dissent
Perhaps the most famous example of sustained dissent is the
long-standing practice of Justices Brennan and Marshall to dissent in
every death penalty case since its constitutionality was affirmed in
1976,22 defiantly refusing to accept the legality of that form of punishment. The seminal, oft-repeated phrase was: “I adhere to my belief
that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment.”23 Justices Brennan and Marshall repeated this dissent more
than 2100 times24 from 1976 to their retirements in 1990 and 1991,
respectively. This is the essence of sustained, indeed perpetual,
dissent.
An examination of the existing, albeit sparse,25 academic
research on this practice yields reasonably consistent definitions.
Allison Larsen writes that “[t]he critical feature of a perpetual dissent”
is a Justice’s “refus[al] to accept the rule of a prior decision (one in
which he originally dissented) as controlling authority.”26 Maurice
Kelman defines “sustained dissent” as when a Justice, presented with a
question decided by a prior case in which the Justice dissented,
“cling[s] to his own doctrinal position” and renews his original dissent.27 Fried defines an “oppositional dissent” as one that “will not
accept the decision even grudgingly . . . and thus implies a refusal to
allow the decision to shelter under stare decisis.”28 Justice Brennan
defined the “special kind of dissent” as one “in which a [J]ustice refuses to yield to the views of the majority although persistently rebuffed
by them.”29 While each of these definitions varies slightly from the
others, each reflects the same basic practice.
22 See Mello, supra note 18, at 593.
23 Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 324 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall joined the dissent. Id. at 309.
24 Mello, supra note 18, at 593. “The Justices dissented not only to the imposition
of capital punishment in cases granted certiorari review, but also in almost every capital case where certiorari was denied.” Id.
25 Larsen observes that, since Kelman’s 1985 essay, “very little has been said about
the practice of perpetual dissents . . . .” Larsen, supra note 16, at 447 n.6.
26 Id. at 451.
27 Kelman, supra note 16, at 230.
28 Fried, supra note 16, at 182. Fried goes on to describe such a dissent as one
where the dissenter “rejects the court’s decision so thoroughly that . . . he will not
collaborate in the work of developing, refining, and perhaps qualifying the Court’s
[future decisions].” Id. at 183.
29 Brennan, supra note 19, at 436.
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For purposes of this Note, analysis is not confined only to those
cases where a Justice participated and dissented in the precedential
case.30 Instead, it is sufficient that a sitting Justice rejects the validity
of, and thus refuses to apply, a precedent that is “on all fours.” Larsen’s nomenclature of “perpetual dissent” is similarly not adopted, as
there is value in exploring the significance of those dissents that, while
perhaps do not extend for the entirety of a Justice’s career on the
Court (like Brennan’s and Marshall’s), nevertheless refuse to accept a
settled rule of law for some substantial period of time. Thus, for purposes of this Note, “sustained dissent” is defined as a Justice’s practice
of refusing to accept the precedential effect of a prior case and, for at
least some substantial period of time, continuing to dissent from
applying the rule of law that case decided.31 Clarifying a definition,
however, only does so much to improve one’s understanding of sustained dissent. To truly comprehend this practice, one must attempt
to understand why Justices engage in it and what factors affect the
decision.
B. Why Justices Engage in Sustained Dissent
While it is true that in the last few decades the Court has overruled more settled decisions than earlier Courts had, claims of the
“recent demise of the Supreme Court’s doctrine of precedent are
greatly exaggerated.”32 In fact, the doctrine of stare decisis “enjoys
lofty status as the emblem of a stable judiciary” and has been lauded
30 For instance, Justice Kagan’s joining the dissent in American Tradition Partnership falls within my definition of sustained dissent. Even though she was not yet a
Justice for the Citizens United decision, she refused to acknowledge the rule of law
clearly established in that case.
31 See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 665 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Until this expansive and judicially
crafted protection of States’ rights runs its course, I shall continue to register my
agreement with the views expressed in the Seminole dissents . . . .”); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 966 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“We have stated . . . our belief that
the Constitution does not subject state abortion regulations to heightened scrutiny.
Accordingly, we think that the correct analysis is that set forth . . . in Webster.”); South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 823–24 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I continue
to believe that Booth was wrongly decided, and . . . I would overrule that case.”).
32 Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 649, 733 (1999). Lee attributes this increase, at
least in part, to the “vast body of constitutional case law [which] presents an everexpanding target of ‘settled decisions.’ ” Id. at 649; see also Kelman, supra note 16, at
248 (“[C]onstitutional cases represented a smaller part of the Court’s work in [the
nineteenth century] . . . .”).
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by the Supreme Court as fundamental to the importance of the rule
of law.33 Even Justice Thomas—the one Justice who, it has been suggested, does not believe in the doctrine of stare decisis34—said at his
confirmation hearing that “stare decisis . . . is a very important and
critical concept” in the “process of [judicial] decision making.”35
Given that the Court values the doctrine of stare decisis and does not
take lightly the decision to disrespect precedent, why would a Justice
engage in sustained dissent? One can safely assume that a Justice who
continues to dissent from precedent believes the prior case was
wrongly decided; but beyond that, what are the justifications for sustained dissent? An examination of the existing research on this practice suggests these reasons can be grouped into three categories:
strategic reasons, institutional reasons, and personal reasons.
Of the three justifications, the strategic justification has received
the most attention in academic literature. Under this theory, the sustained dissent is an extended effort to gain the necessary fifth vote to
overturn the precedent.36 Here, the dissenting Justice assumes that
“the decision[ ] which he opposes will prove to be short lived,”37 or
recognizes that the “ruling is definitive only if the four dissenters . . .
will[ ] accept the decision from which they dissented,” instead of
“hold[ing] on until they can pick up a fifth vote.”38 Therefore, the
sustained dissent is an attempt to prevent the issue from settling, to
encourage challenges to the precedent, and ultimately to effect a
change in the doctrine or rule of law. An example of this is Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,39 which was so oppositional in dissent as to be almost dismissive of the majority. The Chief Justice said he did “not think it incum33 Kozel, supra note 20, at 412–13.
34 See Lincoln Caplan, Clarence Thomas’s Brand of Judicial Logic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 2011, at SR10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/opinion/sunday/clarence-thomass-brand-of-judicial-logic.html; Douglas T. Kendall, A Big Question
About Clarence Thomas, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2004, at A31, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A31117-2004Oct13.html.
35 Kendall, supra note 34. Indeed, “Justice Thomas embrace[s] statutory stare
decisis.” Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 317, 326 n.49 (2005) (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517, 538–39
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
36 See Larsen, supra note 16, at 460.
37 Kelman, supra note 16, at 257.
38 Fried, supra note 16, at 177.
39 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that it is within Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate state governments through generally applicable laws,
without regard to whether the regulated behavior is a “traditional governmental
function”).
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bent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a
principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court.”40 The Chief Justice “promise[d] continued dissent with the hope . . . of eventually prevailing.”41 This type
of sustained dissent has been described as “the child of hope.”42 It
could be said that the Justice who engages in sustained dissent for
strategic reasons is doing so with his eyes on a greater prize—conceding a loss in today’s battle, but continuing the fight with the hope of
ultimately winning the war.
Part of the reason sustained dissent can be an effective strategic
tool is because it prevents the prior decision from hardening into settled law. When a Justice continues to dissent, it signals an ongoing
internal dispute within the Court.43 Indeed, to the extent an initial
dissent indicates a disagreement on the Court, a “pattern of resistance . . . indicates that a precedent is [far more] vulnerable . . . .”44
The Court itself acknowledged this fact in Payne v. Tennessee.45 For
example, in the wake of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,46 where a bloc of
four dissenting Justices promised persistent dissent, Fried observed
that it is “hard to claim that this case has brought stability to the law or
definitively moved the issue to the political arena.”47 The law is settled only if “the four dissenters . . . accept the decision from which
they dissented,”48 or, in other words, refuse to sustain their dissent.
Particularly when one considers that only four votes are required to
grant a petition for certiorari, the sustained dissent can be an effective
strategic tool for prompting change in the law.
40 Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41 Fried, supra note 16, at 178. While Garcia itself was never overturned, the
Rehnquist Court would eventually go “much further in the direction of asserting the
independent position of states” than simply overturning Garcia would have. Id. at 178
n.72.
42 Kelman, supra note 16, at 257.
43 Id. at 254 (“[T]he dissident may imagine that he is preventing the official position from settling into a . . . hardness that will defy future displacement. He may
suppose that the continuing exhibition of his opposition shows the world that the
issue remains in dispute . . . .”).
44 Larsen, supra note 16, at 466.
45 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)). As part of its justification for overruling precedent in that case, the majority noted that the prior decisions “ha[d] been
questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions.” Id. at 829–30.
46 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (affirming the constitutionality of an Ohio school voucher
plan which allowed religious schools to participate).
47 Fried, supra note 16, at 177; see id. at 192.
48 Id. at 177.
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However, this is not a perfect explanation for why Justices engage
in the practice, in that it is both over- and under-inclusive. Scholarly
research suggests that, not only were five-to-four decisions no more
likely to garner sustained dissent, there are numerous examples of
solo sustained dissents.49 The example given at the outset—that of
Justices Brennan and Marshall—was “basically a two-man operation.”50 Furthermore, there is a lack of empirical evidence suggesting
that sustained dissent is effective as a strategic tool.51 If anything,
engaging in sustained dissent merely “advertises the dissenter’s inability to win over his colleagues.”52 So, while the strategic justification
seems to make intuitive sense, existing academic research suggests
that it is not an entirely satisfying explanation for why Justices engage
in sustained dissent.
The institutional justification—whereby a Justice sustains his dissent because he views his acceptance of erroneous precedents as an
abdication of his institutional role—perhaps seems counterintuitive at
first; after all, it is often out of concern for the institutional legitimacy
of the Court that Justices abandon their dissent and surrender to the
doctrine of stare decisis.53
However, depending on how one defines the Court’s institutional
legitimacy—or how a Justice defines his own institutional duty—sustained dissent could be the preferred path. A Justice who views the
Constitution as the ultimate precedent, and who considers correct
interpretation of the Constitution to be his foremost institutional
49 Larsen, supra note 16, at 461; see, e.g., Am. Truck Ass’n v. Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I
would affirm the judgment of the [state court] because ‘[t]he negative Commerce
Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution . . . .’ ” (quoting Camps Newfound/
Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting))).
50 Larsen, supra note 16, at 461. “Similarly, another duo, Justice Thomas and
Justice Scalia, have continually teamed up” to engage in sustained dissent. Id.
51 See Kelman, supra note 16, at 255 (“It is a nice question whether dissent, be it
singular or sustained, actually does contribute to later doctrinal change in a causal
sense. . . . [But] there is nothing in the cases to suggest that sustained dissent is more
potent than dissent uttered once and then suspended.”).
52 Id. at 256.
53 See id. at 230. In “abandon[ing] past dissent under the pressure of stare decisis,” a Justice recognizes his “duty . . . to rejoin his colleagues . . . as if he had concurred (albeit reluctantly) in the first place.” Id. (footnote omitted). For example, in
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), Justice Harlan wrote that, though “the passage of
time ha[d] not made . . . Miranda . . . any more palatable to” him, “purely out of
respect for stare decisis,” he felt “compelled to acquiesce” in the majority’s decision
affirming Miranda. Id. at 327–38 (Harlan, J., concurring). This concept will be discussed in greater detail in Part II.B.
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goal, is more likely to sustain his dissent.54 This justification is not
confined to originalists, however. For instance, Justice Brennan
defended his sustained dissent in death penalty cases partly on institutional grounds.55 Justices, he argued, are “bound . . . by a larger constitutional duty . . . to expose” those Constitutional interpretations
that “have [significantly] departed . . . from its essential meaning.”56
Chief Justice Rehnquist, while sustaining his dissent from Roe v.
Wade,57 argued that “[t]he Judicial Branch derives its legitimacy . . .
from deciding by its best lights whether [laws] . . . comport with the
Constitution.”58 Therefore, he wrote, “[i]t is . . . our duty to reconsider constitutional interpretations that ‘depar[t] from a proper
understanding’ of the Constitution.”59 Similarly, in his essay on the
doctrine of stare decisis, Justice Douglas wrote that, while “[a]
judge . . . may have compulsions to revere past history and accept what
was once written[,] . . . he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which
his predecessors may have put on it.”60
While this institutional approach does not necessarily require a
Justice to sustain his dissent in all future cases, a Justice is warranted in
refusing to accept binding precedent—in continuing to sustain his
dissent—if he believes a proper reading of the Constitution requires
him to do so. This decision does not necessarily derive any motivation
from a desire to effect a change in the law—it need not have a strategic component. Instead, the decision is motivated by a sense of judicial duty to fulfill one’s institutional role. Though this may be a valid
descriptive analysis of the institutional justification, it is difficult to reconcile with the value the Court places in the doctrine of stare decisis.
54 For a discussion of why one’s theory of precedent cannot be divorced from
one’s preferred interpretive method, and an argument that adherence to stare decisis
puts greater stress on originalists, see Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional
Method and the Path of Precedent (Notre Dame Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 12-66,
2012). But see SCALIA, supra note 20, at 139 (“The whole function of the doctrine . . .
is a compromise of all philosophies of interpretation . . . .”); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005)
(“Whatever one’s theory of constitutional interpretation, a theory of stare decisis . . .
always corrupts the original theory.”).
55 See Brennan, supra note 19, at 437.
56 Id.
57 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 963 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
59 Id. at 955 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
557 (1985).
60 William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949).
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The various normative theories discussed in Part II will call into question the propriety of the institutional justification for sustained
dissent.
Finally, a third possible justification for a Justice’s sustained dissent is based on personal reasons—reasons unique to that Justice as
an individual, unrelated to any views about the institutional role of a
Justice. Larsen, for example, raises the possibility that “plain old
strong conviction . . . is driving these perpetual dissents” and that
“finding [out] . . . what pushes his or her individual buttons” is the
best way to predict when a Justice will continue in dissent.61 A comparable theory states that a Justice will engage in sustained dissent when
he has a “deep conviction,” or a “belief not only in the soundness of
his position but [also] in its righteousness.”62 Justice Brennan shared
a similar observation—the “kind of dissent in which a judge persists in
articulating a minority view of the law in case after case . . . constitutes
a statement by the judge as an individual: ‘Here I draw the line.’”63
Under this theory, apart from any possible institutional justification
for sustained dissent as discussed above, the Justice continues his dissent because he absolutely cannot, as a matter of personal principle,
bring himself to agree with the majority view.
This justification, however, need not depend singularly on great
personal conviction. Larsen observes that Justices often sustain dissent as a matter of “self stare decisis.”64 Here, a Justice who dissented
in a prior case and continues to dissent in subsequent cases “do[es]
not want to appear intellectually inconsistent . . . so [he] write[s] separately,” renewing the rationale and arguments from prior cases.65 A
characteristic of this, Fried explains, is when a Justice relies on and
refers to his own prior dissents as authority.66 Whether motivated by a
deep conviction or a desire not to appear intellectually inconsistent, it
is difficult to justify a sustained dissent for personal reasons. The first
two justifications—strategic and institutional—can plausibly be con61 Larsen, supra note 16, at 463.
62 Kelman, supra note 16, at 257. “Deep conviction is the fuel that drives dissent
past the limits of hope, beyond appeal to the intelligence of a future day, and into the
realm of the quixotic. It is why a [J]ustice champions a lost cause.” Id.
63 Brennan, supra note 19, at 437. Brennan worried that such a justification
would “sound like too individualistic a justification of the dissent.” Id. at 438.
64 Larsen, supra note 16, at 469. In this scenario, the dissenting Justice would
have dissented in the prior case.
65 Id. Larsen condemns this practice as “emphasi[zing] . . . the ‘I’ over the ‘We’ ”
and “present[ing] an example of political behavior.” Id. at 470–71. “At bottom, he is
elevating his individual jurisprudence . . . and denigrating the need for consistency . . . in the Court’s doctrine.” Id. at 469.
66 Fried, supra note 16, at 189.
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sidered part of the traditional judicial role. However, a Justice’s stubborn rejection of precedent in order to vindicate his personal
conviction, or even worse, to protect his jurisprudential self-confidence, is at best a cause for concern. Nevertheless, as Larsen observes,
this may be the justification with the greatest predictive force.67
Justices rarely come right out and say what their justification is for
continuing to dissent, making the task of categorizing such behavior
difficult. Admittedly, the categories of justifications may overlap, or
there may be more than one motivating a Justice’s decision.68
Whatever the justification—strategic, institutional, personal, or otherwise69—the practice of sustaining one’s dissent and rejecting the validity of precedent raises significant questions about the importance of
stare decisis and the proper role of Justices on the Court.
C. Factors that Affect the Decision to Engage in Sustained Dissent
There are a number of factors that affect a Justice’s decision to
engage in sustained dissent—some were alluded to in the previous
section. While this Note cannot identify an exhaustive list of relevant
factors, it will attempt to identify those that appear to have a significant impact on the difficult decision to sustain one’s dissent. Some
factors apply more directly to one particular justification and perhaps
not at all to another.
The first and most important factor is the nature of the case; specifically, whether the Justice is being asked to interpret the Constitution or a statute. “Most Justices seem to agree that dissents on issues
of statutory construction deserve less repetition.”70 The Rehnquist
Court frequently indicated that the respect given to an erroneous precedent depends on the statutory or constitutional nature of the decision.71 Because the Constitution gives Congress sole responsibility to
67 See Larsen, supra note 16, at 463.
68 Justice Brennan invoked both an institutional and personal justification for his
continued dissent in death penalty cases. See Brennan, supra note 19, at 437.
69 Larsen suggests, with good reason, that “[p]erhaps the question of when to
dissent perpetually is idiosyncratic and cannot be explained collectively.” Larsen,
supra note 16, at 459.
70 Id.; see also Barrett, supra note 35, at 317 (“The Supreme Court has long given
its cases interpreting statutes special protection from overruling.”); Kelman, supra
note 16, at 237 (“One place where a cessation of dissent occurs with some regularity is
in cases of statutory interpretation.”).
71 Lee, supra note 32, at 655. “Whereas the Court purports to give ‘great weight
to stare decisis in the area of statutory construction,’ it has also claimed that the doctrine ‘is at its weakest when [it] interpret[s] the Constitution.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). Indeed, “Justice Stevens, who has perpetually dissented on a host of topics, will
even acquiesce on statutory issues.” Larsen, supra note 16, at 460.
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enact and amend statutory law,72 the Court is typically unwilling to
depart from a statute’s initial construction in subsequent cases.73 Justices Brennan and Marshall, interestingly enough, provide a classic
illustration of abandoning dissent in the statutory context. Despite
initially dissenting in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers,74 in a subsequent
case75 construing the same statute, the two Justices—”[f]or reasons
essentially of stare decisis”—terminated their initial dissent and contributed the decisive votes for adherence to the construction given to
the statute in Buffalo Forge.76 While sustained dissent in the statutory
context is not unheard of,77 it is extraordinarily rare.78 By contrast, in
her research on the Rehnquist Court era, Larsen discovered that each
Justice sustained dissent from at least one constitutional law decision.79 The rationale for this was explained in the Chief Justice’s dissent in Casey—“[e]rroneous decisions in . . . constitutional cases are
uniquely durable, because correction through legislative action, save
for constitutional amendment, is impossible.”80 Accordingly, in constitutional cases, no Supreme Court Justice sees precedent as completely binding.81 The nature of the case affects decisions to sustain
one’s dissent across the board, regardless of justification; indeed, perhaps it is a necessary assumption in this endeavor.
A second important factor is the perceived strength of the precedent. Challenges to precedent are often inspired by a sign of weakness—either indications of “misgiving” on the part of the Justices who
72 Barrett, supra note 35, at 317.
73 Justice Scalia observed that to do so would “establish within our jurisprudence . . . the dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005).
74 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
75 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702
(1982).
76 Kelman, supra note 16, at 237.
77 Larsen identifies Justice Thomas as willing to sustain his dissent in statutory
cases, such as “his recurring statements in dissent that the Federal Arbitration Act
does not apply to proceedings in state court.” Larsen, supra note 16, at 455–56 (citing
Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
78 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Departure
from our rule of stare decisis in statutory cases is always extraordinary . . . .”).
79 Larsen, supra note 16, at 456–57. Kelman suggests that another reason constitutional cases garner more “[s]tubborn dissent” is “because [J]ustices form such
strong and matured convictions about [constitutional] law that they find it exceedingly hard to make even the limited shift from dissent to . . . accommodation.” Kelman, supra note 16, at 248.
80 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954–55 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
81 Mello, supra note 18, at 656.
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fashioned the doctrine in question or by the doctrine’s “visible deterioration over the course of time.”82 Fried has identified instances of
bloc-dissenting as particularly strong: Here, a bloc of four dissenters
persists in dissent, often on a variety of issues.83 In these scenarios,
the persistence of the bloc-dissents necessarily diminishes the strength
of the precedent—“the distance is but a single vote”84—thereby making the continued dissent of the bloc more effective and more likely to
be sustained. In accord with this principle, Justice Jackson claimed
that the “first essential of a lasting precedent is that the court . . . be
fully committed to its principle” and that the decision is “not a mere
acquiescence but a conviction of those who support it.”85 When that
conviction is lacking, it is not as difficult to justify rejecting the validity
of precedent.86 This factor is particularly relevant to strategic sustained dissents. The “score,” it seems, would not matter to a Justice
dissenting for institutional or personal reasons.87 For the bloc of Justices holding out for that “elusive fifth vote,”88 however, the perceived
strength of the precedent is especially relevant.
The age of the precedent in question is a factor that can affect
the likelihood of sustained dissent in either of two ways.89 For
instance, it could be argued that the newly minted precedent should
be shielded from dissent; respecting it as a “probationary precedent”
that needs time to develop and a chance to “demonstrate its merits.”90
This approach, it could be argued, accords well with the desire to
maintain public faith in the judiciary, because if the Court is quick to
overturn its decisions, such reversals could severely tax the public’s
82 Kelman, supra note 16, at 256.
83 Fried, supra note 16, at 193; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios
for Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of
Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2112 (2002) (“In cases involving the scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers, a regular group of four Justices have dissented repeatedly.
Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg have all announced . . . their intention
to undo the conservative majority’s ‘new federalism’ jurisprudence as soon as they can
muster the requisite five votes.”).
84 Casey, 505 U.S. at 943 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
85 Robert H. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A. J. 334, 335 (1944).
86 Id.
87 For example, there is no indication that Justices Brennan or Marshall actually
believed their continued dissent in death penalty cases would lead the Court to reconsider its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. See Mello, supra note 18, at 650.
Nevertheless, they continued to register their dissent in every opportunity they were
given.
88 Larsen, supra note 16, at 460.
89 Id. at 462.
90 Kelman, supra note 16, at 234.
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faith in the Court’s decisions.91 Conversely, others argue that newer
precedent should be more susceptible to sustained dissent; “stare decisis concerns are . . . weaker for a new decision as it has had less of a
chance to accrue reliance interests.”92 Justice Scalia illustrated the latter view in South Carolina v. Gathers,93 when he observed that “the
respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather than decreases . . .
as the society adjusts itself to their existence, and the surrounding law
becomes premised upon their validity.”94 Given the competing viewpoints, it appears that neither account adequately explains how the
age of precedent impacts a Justice’s decision to engage in sustained
dissent.95 While this factor is often referred to by Justices in dissent,
there are many examples of sustained dissent from old and new precedents alike.96 Therefore, it seems that the age of precedent “can
be . . . either a plus or a minus . . . in determining the [effect] of stare
decisis.”97
However, the apparent lack of clarity on this issue is perhaps less
troubling as one applies the age factor to the different justifications.
If a Justice engages in sustained dissent for institutional reasons, it
could be argued that he is less likely to question a well-aged precedent. This is because of the competing institutional concern of preserving the legitimacy of the Court by not overturning long-settled
decisions.98 Recalling Justice Scalia’s opinion from Gathers, he argued
that, while it is his institutional duty to reconsider incorrect decisions,
those “decisions that have become so embedded in our system of government that return is no longer possible” should be immune from
continued dissent.99 Conversely, if a Justice is engaging in sustained
dissent for strategic purposes, it stands to reason that he would register objection to the precedent as quickly as possible, preventing the
rule of the prior case from hardening into settled doctrine. Indeed,
91 See id. at 235. “The clumsy flip-flop in the Legal Tender Cases a century ago is
still remembered as one of the Supreme Court’s most grievous ‘self-inflicted
wounds.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “Traumatic memories of this sort” may explain why
Justice Stevens, “one of the Court’s most independent [J]ustices,” assumes a
“profound obligation to give recently decided cases the strongest presumption of
validity.” Id. at 235 & n.30.
92 Larsen, supra note 16, at 462.
93 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
94 Id. at 824 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95 Larsen, supra note 16, at 463.
96 Id.
97 Kelman, supra note 16, at 234.
98 See id. at 236 (observing that, when the Court repudiates decisions of
“landmark” stature, there is a substantial concern for the Court’s public image).
99 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 825 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL404.txt

2013]

unknown

sustained dissent

Seq: 17

22-APR-13

11:08

1955

there are many examples—including important doctrinal matters
such as federalism and the scope of the Commerce Clause—of strategic sustained dissents commencing very quickly after the precedential
case was decided.100 So, while it may be true that—in the aggregate—
age of precedent is not a strong indicator of the likelihood of sustained dissent,101 when examined in the context of one’s justification
for doing so, age of precedent may have greater predictive force.
Finally, the basis of the dissenting Justice’s disagreement with the
precedential case—a factor that has not received much attention in
the academic research on sustained dissent—will likely affect a Justice’s decision to reject that precedent and cling to a prior dissent.
For instance, if a Justice fundamentally disagrees with a particular factual assertion upon which a prior Court rested part of its judgment,
that Justice is more likely to reject the validity of the precedent.102 In
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,103 the Court partly based its decision to
overrule Swift v. Tyson104 on its contention that Swift was based on a
faulty historical account.105 In other words, the Court in Swift rested
its decision on a factual assertion that the Erie Court later disagreed
with. There was no change in the facts, which Casey tells us can justify
overruling; it was the Erie Court’s disagreement with the Swift Court’s
historical observation that prompted the overruling.106 This factor is
100 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(renewing dissent from the same group of four Justices who dissented from the
Court’s decision United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (renewing dissent from the same group of four Justices who dissented from the
Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)). These four
cases featured the same bloc of five Justices in the majority and the same bloc of four
Justices in dissent.
101 See supra notes 89, 95–97, and accompanying text.
102 See Kozel, supra note 20, at 427–28 (“The extent of reliance [on precedent] . . .
derives in part from the integrity of the decision’s factual assumptions. When those
assumptions have changed significantly, there will be less reliance on the precedent
by stakeholders, who will expect the Court to update . . . the decision in light of new
circumstances.”).
103 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
104 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
105 Erie, 304 U.S. at 72 (“But it was the more recent research of a competent
scholar, who examined the original document, which established that the construction given to it by the Court was erroneous . . . .”).
106 A similar example is Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, the
Court based its decision to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in part
on its contention that Bowers erred in its assessment of the history of laws regulating
homosexual behavior. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (“In summary, the historical grounds
relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority . . . and the concurring
opinion [of Chief Justice Burger] . . . indicate. Their historical premises are not with-
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present in the context of antitrust as well. In 2006, a majority of the
Court, in deciding whether a patent conferred sufficient market
power to constitute a violation of the antitrust laws, rejected an applicable precedent because it disagreed with the earlier Court’s economic judgment on the question.107 Thus, the cases suggest that
when a Justice’s discord with precedent is based on his disagreement
with a prior Court’s factual, non-legal assertion, the Justice will accord
less respect to the case, and that such a disagreement could be a relevant factor in the Justice’s decision to sustain his dissent. This factor,
however, is just one of many that may affect a Justice’s decision. Parts
II and III will offer guidance on how a Justice should consider and
weigh the various factors in formulating his decision whether to sustain his dissent.
Armed with the knowledge from Part I—what sustained dissent is,
what Justices are seeking to accomplish by engaging in it, and what
factors may affect the decision whether to do so—one can begin to
tackle the more interesting question: is sustained dissent justified?
Parts II and III will present competing views of the appropriateness of
the practice, weighing the various costs and benefits associated with it,
determining when it is and is not justified, and exploring how the
practice, if properly restrained, may lead to better judicial decisions.
II. THE CRITICAL VIEW

OF

SUSTAINED DISSENT

If Justices Brennan and Marshall provide the paradigmatic example of sustained dissent,108 the second Justice Harlan is perhaps the
modern Court’s “leading accommodationist.”109 Described as a “conout doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.”). Again, both cases were assessing
the “facts on the ground” as they were before Bowers was decided, so it is impossible
that those facts had changed. Rather, the Lawrence Court’s rejection of Bowers was
based on its disagreement with Bowers’s “version,” so to speak, of the facts.
107 See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). In contradicting the precedent, the Court observed that “the vast majority of academic literature recognizes that a patent does not necessarily confer market power.” Id. at 44.
108 Justices Brennan and Marshall are not extraordinary in this regard. While
their collective practice of dissenting in every death penalty case post-1976 is perhaps
most illustrative of the practice generally, many contemporaries of Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined them in engaging in sustained dissent. See Larsen, supra note 16,
at 454 (“During Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas were the most prolific authors of perpetual dissents.”).
109 Kelman, supra note 16, at 274; see also supra note 53 (explaining Justice
Harlan’s opinion on stare decisis and that he felt “compelled to acquiesce” to the
majority). The second Justice Harlan (1955–1971) is not to be confused with the first
Justice Harlan (1877–1911), who Kelman describes as “no stranger to repeated dissent.” Kelman, supra note 16, at 250.
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stitutional conservative on an increasingly activist Court,” Justice
Harlan often found himself in the minority.110 However, instead of
continuing to act as an oppositional force, Justice Harlan offered
“interim allegiance,” and in many cases “extended full precedential
respect,” to those cases with which he initially disagreed.111 While Justice Harlan made sure to register his disagreement with the correctness of the precedent and often hoped his own position would one
day prevail, he nevertheless accepted and applied the precedent faithfully.112 This approach has been lauded, and indeed preferred, by the
existing scholarship that addresses sustained dissent.113 Indeed, for
reasons ranging from the practice’s perceived weakening of reliance
on the Court’s decisions to its implications for the institutional legitimacy of the Court, most academics have taken a critical view of sustained dissent.114 This Part will explore the potential negative
consequences of the practice, identify those limited situations where
those who are critical of the practice may nevertheless tolerate it, and
examine a proposed alternative.
A. Potential Negative Consequences of Sustained Dissent
Opponents or skeptics of sustained dissent do not question the
practice merely for ideological reasons. Indeed, as this Note shows,
Justices at each end of the Court’s ideological spectrum engage in the
110 Kelman, supra note 16, at 274.
111 Id.; see also Fried, supra note 16, at 190–91 (“Justice Harlan[ ] . . . made it a
practice to let go and rejoin the communal task of knitting the continuing fabric of
the law.”); Larsen, supra note 16, at 452 (“A known critic of Mapp v. Ohio and Miranda
v. Arizona, Justice Harlan routinely joined subsequent cases that required application
of those precedents . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
112 See Kelman, supra note 16, at 275; Larsen, supra note 16, at 452. Justice
Harlan’s practice of applying the precedent but questioning its correctness is not the
same as concurring with the judgment of the Court for different reasons. In the former, the Justice begrudgingly applies the precedent; in the latter, the Justice does not
apply the precedent, but still arrives at the same outcome as those who do.
113 See Kelman, supra note 16, at 298 (“I admire the collegialism of Justice Harlan
more than the soloism of Justice Black.”); Larsen, supra note 16, at 477 (“I therefore
suggest that the Harlan approach is a healthy alternative to the perpetual dissenter.”).
114 See Fried, supra note 16, at 192; Larsen, supra note 16, at 475 (“By disregarding
precedent simply because he lost the first time around, a perpetual dissenter . . . gives
credence to the claim that the Court is just a building where nine viewpoints are
periodically counted and tallied.”); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 83, at 2109 (“[A]
policy of openly refusing to accept prior precedents of the Supreme Court [is] incredibly imprudent.”); Neil S. Siegel, State Sovereign Immunity and Stare Decisis: Solving the
Prisoners’ Dilemma Within the Court, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1165 (2001) (criticizing the Court’s
lack of respect for precedent in the context of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign
immunity cases).
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practice with some degree of frequency.115 Nor are their objections
based simply on theoretical or jurisprudential differences. Opponents of sustained dissent have raised concerns that widespread use of
the practice will lead to significant practical challenges—challenges
that could ultimately hinder the Court’s fundamental role. Therefore, an examination of these potential negative consequences is necessary before one can make a reasoned judgment on the
appropriateness of the practice.
Opponents of sustained dissent contend that, by engaging in the
practice, a Justice takes himself out of the collaborative decision-making process of the Court.116 A Justice who continually dissents—not
only from the initial decision, but also from the subsequent decisions
that shape the body of law—is rejecting the opportunity to “collaborate in the work of developing, refining, and perhaps qualifying the
Court’s work . . . .”117 This decision deprives the internal debate of a
differing—often moderating—voice.118 Because there is value in having diverse viewpoints on the Court119 and the decision-making process in the Supreme Court is a collaborative enterprise, a Justice’s
refusal to engage in that enterprise with the majority means she cannot prevent one bad decision from proliferating into a line of many
bad decisions, and cannot “bring the doctrine closer to where she
believes it should be heading.”120 Opponents argue that, to the
extent a Justice is committed to continuing a prior dissent and refuses
to work cohesively with the other Justices to reach a good—if not
ideal—outcome, the substantive doctrine suffers from a lack of diverse
viewpoints.
Aside from any implications for the substantive doctrine itself,
another possible negative consequence of sustaining one’s dissent is
that the practice may harm reliance interests in the Court’s decisions.121 It is argued that, since sustained dissent “implies a refusal to
115 See Krotoszynski, supra note 83, at 2111 (“[P]erpetual dissent . . . knows no
ideological boundaries.”).
116 See Fried, supra note 16, at 183; see also Larsen, supra note 16, at 473 (“A third
consequence [of] perpetual dissents is the deprivation of a voice at Conference . . . .).
117 Fried, supra note 16, at 183.
118 See Larsen, supra note 16, at 473.
119 See id.
120 Fried, supra note 16, at 181.
121 See Larsen, supra note 16, at 472. For further discussion of how disrespecting
precedent harms reliance on the Court’s decisions, see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808 (1991). Such behavior “sends a clear signal that scores of established constitutional liberties are now ripe for reconsideration, thereby inviting the very type of open
defiance of our precedents that the majority rewards in this case.” Id. at 845 (Marshall, J., dissenting). While Payne was an instance of overruling precedent, instead of
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allow the decision to shelter under stare decisis,”122 if “the public discovers the fragility of [the] precedent . . . the decision’s ability to stimulate reliance decreases.”123 In this context, sustained dissent has
negative implications for the stability of doctrine, particularly where
the change of a single vote threatens to undo a generation’s worth of
precedent.124 One is reminded of the headline from the joint opinion in Casey—“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”125
Since the ability to rely on the Court’s decisions is of great importance
for private legal ordering and stability within the law,126 the consequences of sustaining one’s dissent can stretch far beyond mere jurisprudential theory and into “real life.”
This problem is particularly acute when one considers the modern stare decisis factors laid out in Casey.127 When the Court contemplates whether to overturn an erroneous precedent, one of the factors
it takes into consideration is whether the decision has garnered substantial reliance.128 Thus, “a continued campaign to erode the public’s faith in a precedent can . . . sabotage [it] from the start.”129 By
continually questioning the validity and correctness of a precedent, a
minority of Justices can affect a future Court’s evaluation of the
degree of reliance that precedent has received.130 This creates a sort
of self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby the sustained dissent of the minority makes a future overruling more likely—a phenomenon that raises
serious questions about stability and reliance, among other things.131
Reliance is inextricably linked to the doctrine of stare decisis; a Jusmerely continuing in dissent, the implications for reliance interests are quite similar.
Mello, supra note 18, at 650.
122 Fried, supra note 16, at 182.
123 Larsen, supra note 16, at 472.
124 Fried, supra note 16, at 185, 193.
125 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
126 Lee, supra note 32, at 653 (“[A] doctrine of reliance on precedent furthers the
goal of stability by enabling parties to settle their disputes without resorting to the
courts.”).
127 See supra note 14.
128 Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (asking “whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling”). The joint
opinion in Casey ultimately concluded that “Americans had structured their lives in
reliance on Roe,” a finding that “cautioned against overruling the decision.” Larsen,
supra note 16, at 472.
129 Larsen, supra note 16, at 473.
130 See supra note 45.
131 As Larsen observes, “there is something mischievous about the fact that a nonmajority of the Court can affect a test that is applied by a majority Court in the
future.” Larsen, supra note 16, at 473.
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tice’s rejection of precedent has practically unavoidable negative consequences for reliance interests.
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the practice of sustained dissent is that it may undermine the legitimacy of the Court as
an institution.132 Opponents argue that “[w]hen a Justice continues
to dissent on an issue that is controlled by an earlier decision,” and
thus rejects the validity of existing precedent, “he upsets the common
perception that the Court is bound by neutral principles.”133 Persistent, unapologetic dissent serves to validate the criticism that “the
Court is . . . composed of unelected judges free to write their policy
views into law.”134 It gives credence to the claim that the Court is
nothing more than a glorified voting booth135 and inspires hope that
a mere change in the Court’s membership will lead to significant doctrinal changes.136 In Payne, Justice Marshall indicated that such a dismissive view of stare decisis would “destroy the Court’s very capacity to
resolve authoritatively the abiding conflicts” of the day.137 Indeed, in
Casey, the plurality opinion devoted an entire section to explaining
132 See id. at 473–75; see also Lee, supra note 32, at 653 (“Stare decisis is also
thought to preserve the Court’s legitimacy.”).
133 Larsen, supra note 16, at 474.
134 Powell, supra note 12, at 16; see also Fried, supra note 16, at 178–79 (arguing
that the promise of persistence in dissent reduces the Court to a political entity);
Larsen, supra note 16, at 473–74 (“[A] commitment to precedent is what insulates the
Court from being perceived as a political institution.”).
135 See Larsen, supra note 16, at 475.
136 See Fried, supra note 16, at 195 (lamenting as “quite dispiriting” the fact that
observers of the Court “speak of . . . the effect of changes in personnel” as relevant to
the Court’s jurisprudence); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 845 (1991)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Speaking for the Court as then constituted . . . .” (emphasis
added)); Larsen, supra note 16, at 474 (observing that sustained dissent gives the
impression that the Court “chang[es] its mind when it changes its membership,”
which creates the impression that it is “a mere political machine”). Indeed, these
concerns are not without merit. Many articles have been written suggesting the
Court’s inhabitants are merely political actors. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, The Myth of a
Conservative Supreme Court: The October 2000 Term, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 287
(2003) (“Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer . . . constitute a highly reliable
and predictable liberal bloc, which illustrates how little law and how much ideology
affects Supreme Court decision-making.”).
137 Payne, 501 U.S. at 853. Justice Marshall continued “[i]f this Court shows so
little respect for its own precedents, it can hardly expect them to be treated more
respectfully by the state actors whom these decisions are supposed to bind.” Id. This
sentiment was echoed one year later in Casey, when the plurality opinion observed
that “overruling Roe’s central holding would . . . seriously weaken the Court’s capacity
to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation
dedicated to the rule of law.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
865 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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why not adhering to Roe would lead to a substantial degradation of the
Court’s legitimacy.138 If the opponents of sustained dissent are correct and the perception begins to take hold that the Court is nothing
more than a venue for political actors to vindicate their policy views,
rather than a principled body that exhibits judicial restraint and due
respect for precedent, such a perception may be difficult—if not
impossible—to shake.
Furthermore, such a development would be undeniably damaging to the Court. The Court’s power is almost entirely dependent on
its actual and perceived legitimacy.139 Having control of neither the
sword nor the purse, the Court must rely on its judgment.140 Thus,
the Court’s authority “ultimately rests on sustained public confidence
in its moral sanction.”141 Chief Justice Marshall recognized this reality
at the Court’s infancy, seeking at every opportunity to establish consensus among the Court and to project strength and unanimity as a
means of securing the Court’s power.142 While that commitment has
perhaps waned throughout the years, Chief Justice Roberts adheres to
this view as well.143 The Chief Justice believes that the appearance of
disagreement within the Court “make[s] it harder for the public to
respect the Court as an impartial institution that transcends partisan
politics.”144 Consider the implications for the Court’s decision in
138 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 864–69.
139 See id. at 865 (“The Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy . . . .”); see also
Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107,
1108–09 (1995) (arguing that “an opinion must look principled as well as be principled in
order to legitimately and justifiably fulfill the judicial function”); Larsen, supra note
16, at 474 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s power and general effectiveness depends on its
public image . . . .”).
140 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1982).
141 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
142 Note, From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful” Dissent, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (2011) (“Recognizing that an activist Court produced substantial institutional costs . . . .”); see also Shepard, supra note 19, at 337 (“The Marshall court ushered in a new practice of issuing a single opinion for the whole bench
rather than separate opinions for each of the [J]ustices.”).
143 Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 104, 105, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/
305559/.
144 Id. (“In Roberts’s view, the most successful chief justices help their colleagues
speak with one voice. Unanimous . . . decisions . . . contribute to the stability of the
law and the continuity of the Court . . . .”); see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
711 (2004) (“A unanimous opinion of the Court inspires a measure of respect and
obedience that even a single dissent bespatters. A single opinion says that the nine
men have in union apprehended truth and now reveal it . . . .”).
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Brown v. Board of Education145 had it—and each subsequent decision
applying Brown—been a deeply divisive five-to-four battle, rather than
a unanimous decision.146 Indeed, Justice Stanley Reed—a Southern
Justice who was the last holdout from unanimity in Brown147—joined
the unanimous opinion not because he thought it was correct, but
because he recognized the importance of presenting a united front to
the American people, especially those inclined to disagree with the
Court’s holding.148 In stark contrast to sustaining his dissent, Justice
Reed sacrificed even the initial dissent in the interest of preserving
what he viewed as the Court’s legitimacy.149 While it is not clear
whether widespread sustained dissent would, in fact, substantially tarnish the Court’s public image, it is clear that any diminution in the
Court’s perceived legitimacy would be unfortunate. As the plurality in
Casey warned:
If the Court’s legitimacy should be undermined, then, so would the
country be [undermined] in its very ability to see itself through its
constitutional ideals. The Court’s concern with legitimacy is not for
the sake of the Court, but for the sake of the Nation to which it is
responsible.150

B. The Preferred Alternative
Despite taking a mostly critical view of the practice of sustained
dissent for the reasons discussed above, the existing academic literature on this practice has not ruled out its usefulness completely.
While scholars lament the “rampant” and “haphazard[ ]” use of the
145 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146 See, e.g., STEPHEN GOTTLIEB, MORALITY IMPOSED 196 (2000) (“[A]ll the members of the Court understood the importance of unanimity [in Brown].”); see also Stephen Ellmann, The Rule of Law and the Achievement of Unanimity in Brown, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 741 (2005) (chronicling the way in which the Court achieved unanimity
by securing the vote of Justice Stanley Reed).
147 See KLUGER, supra note 144, at 711 (“It was Reed whose yielding at the end of
the Court’s deliberative process had given the decision its extra, crucial dimension:
the Justices had spoken as one.”).
148 See Ellmann, supra note 146, at 757 (“Reed might have set aside his own convictions . . . because he felt that a unanimous decision would be better for the country
and the Court than the same outcome arrived at by an 8-1 vote. . . . [E]ven a lone
dissent by him would give a lot of people a lot of [cover] for making trouble. For the
good of the country, he put aside his own basis for dissent.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
149 KLUGER, supra note 144, at 702 (“For the good of the country, he put aside his
own basis for dissent.” (citation omitted)).
150 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
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practice over the last two decades, many nevertheless concede that it
can be valuable if subject to some significant restraint.151 Employed
very rarely—as a means of judicial civil disobedience—Larsen argues
that sustained dissent becomes a powerful tool for communicating
with the public.152 “If . . . perpetual dissents . . . are rare . . . their
effect on the audience changes: a signal is sent indicating the importance of an issue or the need for continued debate or impending
change.”153 Furthermore, such an approach would minimize institutional costs, as the Court’s legitimacy “would be re-affirmed more
often than it would be eroded.”154 Kelman concedes that sustained
dissent can improve the Court’s debate and achieve doctrinal results
of greater clarity.155 “In favor of the course of unremitting dissent . . .
is its quality of directness. . . . There is no over-subtlety, no distortion
by any other concerns than the intrinsic merits of the case.”156 Yet,
like Larsen, Kelman advocates substantial modesty in its employment,
encouraging Justices to “ask themselves whether there are special reasons why they should persist in dissent. And ‘I still think I am right
and my colleagues are wrong’ is not . . . a fully sufficient basis for
repetition of dissent.”157
Absent significant restraint, scholars find the practice mostly
troubling, describing it as “unsettling” and “quite dispiriting,”158 and
likening it to the fable of “the boy who cries wolf”159—it happens so
much that observers are not sure when to believe that the issue is truly
important. Meanwhile, critics bemoan the system’s accumulation of
substantial institutional costs without realizing any significant benefits,
other than perhaps a Justice’s personal doctrinal consistency. While
scholars acknowledge some value in the practice, they argue that value
is confined to very limited circumstances, and that it is not appropriate for a Justice to consider sustained dissent outside those
circumstances.
What is a Justice to do then? If widespread sustained dissent may
discourage reliance and harm the Court’s public reputation, is a Justice supposed to simply go along with his colleagues and swallow his
disagreement? Not necessarily. Attributed to the second Justice
151 See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 16, at 449, 475.
152 See id. at 477–78.
153 Id. at 475.
154 Id. at 476.
155 See Kelman, supra note 16, at 254.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 297.
158 Fried, supra note 16, at 192, 195.
159 Larsen, supra note 16, at 475.
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Harlan, scholars encourage an alternative practice, whereby a Justice
writes a separate opinion that indicates disagreement with precedent,
but nevertheless accepts it as controlling and applies it faithfully.160
Referred to, metaphorically, as “cold storage,” the Justice need not
abandon his disagreement or his hope that an alternative view may
one day prevail; but in the meantime—“until a countermajority can
be marshaled for corrective action”161—the Justice should shelve his
dissent, accept the precedent as valid, and avoid the temptation to call
its legitimacy into question. By doing this, the Justice is able to register his disagreement with the Court and indicate that the precedent is
perhaps vulnerable, without appearing to be oppositional or obstructionist. Such an approach, its proponents argue, has “pragmatic and
institutional benefits,”162 avoids the negative consequences of sustained dissent, and offers a healthy alternative to a Justice wishing to
satisfy compelling, yet competing interests.
In sum, the existing academic literature takes a mostly negative
view of the practice of sustained dissent.163 Scholars have identified a
broad range of negative consequences that they argue result from the
practice, chiefly its capacity to permanently alter the public’s perception of the Court. In light of these consequences, they argue that Justices should reserve their sustained dissent for extraordinarily rare
circumstances, and instead place their disagreement into “cold storage” until the appropriate opportunity to overrule the precedent
presents itself. Such restraint, it is argued, minimizes institutional
costs without requiring a Justice to abandon his judicial principles.
Part III of this Note will address the criticisms raised in Part II and
present a more favorable view of sustained dissent.
III. A MORE FAVORABLE VIEW

OF

SUSTAINED DISSENT

The concerns discussed in Part II are not without merit. Apprehension over the potential for a delegitimized Supreme Court and
judicial decisions unable to foster the necessary degree of reliance is
understandable. Nevertheless, while sustained dissent does impose
some institutional costs, the practice is not as perilous as the existing
academic literature maintains. Properly focused, sustaining in one’s
160 Larsen refers to this practice as “concurrence under duress.” Id. at 449–50.
Kelman refers to it as “temporary cold storage,” “temporary acquiescence,” and “selfsubordination.” Kelman, supra note 16, at 230–31 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
161 Kelman, supra note 16, at 258–59.
162 Id. at 297.
163 See supra note 114.
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dissent can improve the quality of judicial decisions and minimize
concerns over decreased reliance, all without harming the public’s
perception of the Court. Acknowledging that the practice must
undoubtedly be constrained by pragmatic and institutional concerns,
Justices should not place excessive limits on their use of the practice,
as the value of sustained dissent extends beyond its use as merely an
act of judicial civil disobedience.
This Part will respond to the negative consequences raised in Part
II—not by suggesting that the concerns implicated are insignificant,
but by explaining that it is a tenuous argument, at best, that the
Court’s engagement in sustained dissent is likely to lead to the consequences feared. After mitigating those concerns, this Part will explore
value in the practice that has not been sufficiently discussed by the
existing academic literature—namely, that sustaining one’s dissent
can be an effective means of extending the deliberative process of the
Court, leading to judicial decisions that are of higher quality and are
better able to garner respect and reliance in the long run. This Part
will acknowledge the need for meaningful restraint on the part of Justices, but will ultimately advocate a more substantial role for sustained
dissent than the one many scholars deem appropriate. Only after adequately addressing the criticisms raised in Part II and examining the
unexplored potential value of sustained dissent can one begin to
make an informed judgment about the appropriateness of the
practice.
A. Responding to the Negative Consequences
As stated above, the concerns raised in Part II are not without
merit. The quality and coherence of the Court’s decisions, its ability
to foster reliance on them, and the Court’s broader institutional legitimacy are all of vital importance, not only to our judiciary, but also to
our government and the greater principle of the separation of powers.
However, opponents of sustained dissent either overstate the negative
impact the practice has on these vital interests or fail to adequately
account for countervailing benefits the practice can confer.
Opponents of sustained dissent argue that, because the sustained
dissenter removes his oppositional voice from the collaborative judicial process, the practice has a negative effect on the development of
the substantive body of law.164 However, engaging in sustained dissent can actually have a positive, clarifying effect on the doctrine at
issue. Much has been written about the value of a good dissent and
164

See supra Part II.A.
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how it can provide an appropriate context for the majority’s decision.165 For example, a dissent can “demonstrate[ ] flaws the author
perceives in the majority’s legal analysis” and “emphasize[ ] the limits
of a majority’s decision . . . .”166 And while a dissent will not always
lead to some future correction in the law, that does not mean it is
without value; a dissent still can serve as a clarifying, moderating lens
through which the majority decision is viewed.167 And there is no reason that a dissent must cease to have a clarifying, moderating effect
after only one iteration. As the Court begins to apply and shape that
body of law in future cases, a continued dissenting voice can still serve
this valuable purpose. Consider the dissent in United States v. Morrison,168 where Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer sustained
their dissent from United States v. Lopez.169 In Lopez, the Court limited
the reach of Congress’s authority to act under the Commerce Clause
by holding that simple possession of a firearm was noneconomic activity, and thus it could not, even in the aggregate, have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.170 The Morrison Court relied on Lopez
in determining that, since violence against women was noneconomic
activity, it likewise could not satisfy the “substantial effects” test.171 In
dissent, the four Justices reiterated their dissent from Lopez, but
applied it to a factual context that placed even greater strain on the
Court’s analysis in Lopez.172 Indeed, the argument that noneconomic
activity does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce
appeared weaker in the context of Morrison than it did in Lopez. And
165 See supra note 19.
166 Brennan, supra note 19, at 430. “[T]he dissent . . . safeguards the integrity of
the judicial decision-making process by keeping the majority accountable for the
rationale and consequences of its decision. . . . [V]igorous debate improves the final
product by forcing the prevailing side to deal with the hardest questions urged by the
losing side.” Id.
167 Shepard, supra note 19, at 338–39.
168 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
169 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 See id. at 567–68 (majority opinion).
171 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (majority opinion) (“We accordingly reject the
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based
solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.” (citing
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (majority opinion))).
172 Id. at 628–31 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“One obvious difference from United
States v. Lopez is the mountain of data assembled by Congress, here showing the effects
of violence against women on interstate commerce. . . . [W]e have the benefit of
specific factual findings in the eight separate Reports issued by Congress and its committees . . . .” (citations omitted)).
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to the extent the four Justices’ continuation of their prior dissent
raised this issue in a different factual context, and further pressed the
majority’s reasoning, the renewed dissent had value. Sustaining one’s
dissent need not amount to a wholesale rejection of the doctrine of
stare decisis; it need not shake the public’s faith in the Court. Rather,
it is an opportunity for the Justice to continue to point out the majority’s flaws, to apply those criticisms to different factual scenarios, and
to provide lower court judges with a richer background and context in
which to interpret the majority opinion.
Furthermore, in terms of doctrinal clarity, sustained dissents are
valuable for what they are not—distortions of precedent. To the
extent a Justice who disagrees with a precedent nevertheless adopts it
but applies it unfaithfully, or attempts to twist the precedent to accommodate the outcome he seeks, future holdings become unnecessarily
narrow and confusing.173 These opinions do not represent a true
acceptance of the precedent, but rather a compromised approach
that can become counterproductive in the long run by muddying the
doctrinal waters. Sustained dissent, by contrast, maintains a truly
adversarial voice throughout the opinion and promotes clarity in the
doctrine. An example of this problem is found in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz,174 a 2006 case where the Court confronted its
prior holding in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.175 In Katz, the
majority, comprised of the four dissenting Justices from Seminole Tribe
and Justice O’Connor, did not purport to overrule Seminole Tribe, but
applied its holding very narrowly and in a way the dissenters thought
was unfaithful to the precedent.176 Justice Thomas concluded his dissent by criticizing the majority for, in a sense, overruling Seminole Tribe
by subterfuge: “It would be one thing if the majority simply wanted to
overrule Seminole Tribe altogether. That would be wrong, but at least
the terms of our disagreement would be transparent. The majority’s
action today, by contrast, is difficult to comprehend.”177 Had the four
173 Larsen, supra note 16, at 467 (“[A] perpetual dissent . . . prevents subtle tinkering with doctrine and the muddying of the rule of law.”). Sustained dissent also prevents the majority from “bend[ing] over backwards to accommodate the dissenters,”
which would result in “narrow case-specific holdings with no clear rules to guide the
future.” Id.
174 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
175 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
176 Katz, 546 U.S. at 379–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). “[T]oday’s decision thus
cannot be reconciled with our established sovereign immunity jurisprudence . . . .”
Id. at 382.
177 Id. at 393; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984–85
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the plurality for claiming to be adhering to precedent, but, in his view, distorting
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Justices sustained their initial dissent from Seminole Tribe instead of
straining to reach their conclusion without squarely disrupting Seminole Tribe, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity might be more
clearly understood and less vexing for lower court judges.178 With
these concerns of clarity in mind, Justice Scalia’s partial dissent from
Casey is apt—“Reason finds no refuge in this jurisprudence of confusion.”179 Sustained dissent, in contrast to what its detractors may
argue, can have a positive effect on the clarity of judicial decisions and
coherence of a body of law by maintaining clear terms of disagreement and by decreasing the likelihood that a Justice will accord faux
respect to precedent with which he truly disagrees.
Opponents of sustained dissent further argue that, if Justices
insist on engaging in sustained dissent and repeatedly rejecting the
validity of the Court’s precedent, such behavior will harm the ability
of the Court to stimulate the necessary degree of reliance on its decisions.180 This is an inherent jurisprudential conundrum, however,
and is hardly specific to sustained dissent. By tilting the scales too far
in the direction of reliance concerns, opponents of sustained dissent
unnecessarily impinge on the fundamental role of the Court—arriving at correct interpretations of the Constitution.181 Moreover, by
paying too much respect to reliance interests, the Court dooms itself
to “keep repeating and reaffirming[ ] mistakes forever,” foreclosing
it); cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 835 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A decision of this Court which, while not overruling a prior holding, nonetheless announces
a novel rule . . . should be approached with great caution.”). For further discussion of
“stealth overruling,” see Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010).
178 For a discussion of Katz’s contribution to the confusing status of the Court’s
state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, see Scott Fruehwald, The Supreme Court’s Confusing State Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 253, 299–300 (2008)
(“There is nothing in the text of the Constitution or the history of the Bankruptcy
Clause that even suggests that Congress intended to create an exception to states’
sovereign immunity in this clause. . . . [T]he majority’s untethered decision in Katz is
legal reasoning of the worst kind.”); T. Haller Jackson IV, Fee Shifting and Sovereign
Immunity After Seminole Tribe, 88 NEB. L. REV. 1, 42 (2009) (“Katz represents a . . .
dramatic methodological break from Seminole Tribe . . . .”); see also Friedman, supra
note 177, at 46 (“The first evil of stealth overruling is that in some cases it makes it
difficult if not impossible for the lower courts to know what they are being instructed
to do.”).
179 Casey, 505 U.S. at 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
180 See supra Part II.A.
181 “Our task is, as always, to decide only whether the challenged provisions of a
law comport with the United States Constitution.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 979 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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the possibility that the Court could correct its own harmfully erroneous decisions, or that the political branches could do so.182 Admittedly, reliance is an important judicial consideration. It is most
relevant when issues of contract or property are concerned183—those
areas of the law where, as Justice Brandeis said, it is better that the law
be settled than right.184 But concerns for reliance must not be made
to dominate countervailing interests, such as the interest in arriving at
a correct interpretation of the highest precedent—the Constitution.185 Particularly where the precedent demonstrably conflicts with
the Constitution, rendering reliance on it less reasonable, the role of
reliance would be significantly diminished.186
Moreover, it is not a foregone conclusion that sustained dissent
will, in fact, harm reliance interests; indeed, if properly focused, the
practice could strengthen reliance. Assuming that sustained dissent
182 Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Precedent on the High Court: More on
Bakke and Bowers: Part Two of a Three-Part Series on Stare Decisis, FINDLAW (Dec. 27,
2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20021227.html. The Amars offer the
intriguing theory that the Court can rely on the political branches to correct erroneous decisions, so long as the Court admits its mistake. For instance, though it might
be inappropriate for the Court to announce a prospective, gradually phased-in correction, it would not be improper for the legislature to do so. Therefore, “it is crucial for
judges to tell us if they have indeed erred in the past so that the other branches may
properly ponder their constitutionally permissible options.” Id.
183 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of
stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where
reliance interests are involved . . . .”); see also Lee, supra note 32, at 652–53 (recognizing that overruling precedent that establishes rules for contract, property, or other
commercial relationships would undermine economic growth and stability).
184 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also Kozel, supra note 54 (“This article provides a systematic analysis of
the ways in which theories of precedent are—and are not—derivative of overarching
methods of constitutional interpretation.”).
185 Amar and Amar wrote:
[T]he Constitution, not the Court’s case law, is what ‘We the People’ ratified
in the 1780s . . . . It is the document that creates the judiciary, not vice versa.
Indeed, the same Constitution . . . requires all judges to swear an oath of
allegiance not to their past rulings, but to the document itself. . . . Marbury v.
Madison . . . makes clear that the entire basis of judicial review is to ensure
compliance with the Constitution itself, as opposed to the misinterpretations
of the Constitution by any branch of government—whether Congress or the
President, or the judiciary itself.
Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How Should the Supreme Court Weigh Its Own
Precedent?: This Term, the Court Confronts Stare Decisis, FINDLAW (Dec. 13, 2002), http://
writ.lp.findlaw.com/amar/20021213.html.
186 See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011,
1061–64 (2003).
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would not be perpetual, but rather would be abandoned once the Justice realizes that the competing view has ultimately prevailed, the
more difficult path taken to respected precedent would convey a
greater finality to the judicial process, and thus foster greater reliance.187 Under this theory, because the rule of law would have been
tested in multiple factual contexts and subject to many iterations of
debate and dissent, the final outcome would be battle tested and
afforded greater respect.188 This position, developed more fully in
Part III.B, is contestable, but the point is that potential harm to reliance interests needs not be a deal breaker for those pondering the
appropriateness of sustained dissent. Harm to reliance interests is not
inevitable—indeed, there is no empirical proof that increased use of
sustained dissent in the modern Court has significantly harmed reliance interests. And if properly focused, sustained dissent could
improve reliance on the Court’s decisions. Even if reliance is marginally harmed, however, there are countervailing benefits which counsel
against a per se rejection of sustained dissent.
Finally, opponents of sustained dissent argue that, if the practice
becomes too widespread, it could permanently undermine the legitimacy of the Court as an institution, relegating it to nothing more than
a third political branch.189 It is difficult to contest the assertion that
the current Supreme Court is dealing with a public image problem.
In a June 2012 poll conducted by Gallup, only 15% of respondents
said they had a “great deal” of confidence in the Court, whereas 20%
said they had “very little” confidence.190 The percentage of respondents who said they had either a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the Court averaged 47.5% from 1973 to 2004, but has
averaged only 37% from 2005 to 2012.191 The numbers certainly suggest that something is afoot. However, this reality is symptomatic of a
broader trend. Confidence in public institutions has been decreasing
steadily over the last few decades, and the Court currently places well
ahead of other vital institutions, such as big business and organized
labor, the presidency, Congress, banks, public schools, and the

187 See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204,
1205–06 (2006) (“Super precedents are the constitutional decisions whose correctness is no longer a viable issue for courts to decide . . . .”).
188 Id. at 1206.
189 See supra Part II.A.
190 GALLUP, Confidence in Institutions (June 7–10, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx.
191 See id.
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media.192 This does not mean the Court should not worry about its
public image; as stated above, because of its unique nature, the Court
relies more on the appearance of legitimacy than other institutions
do.193 It simply suggests that there are broader issues in play, and
something as esoteric as a Justice’s approach to sustained dissent is
unlikely to be noticed by the public, let alone have a negative impact
on the Court’s perceived legitimacy. For instance, according to a
2010 survey conducted by C-SPAN, 67% of respondents could not
name a single case ever heard by the Supreme Court,194 and a similar
survey indicates that 66% of Americans could not name a single
Supreme Court Justice.195 Simply put, the extent to which engaging
in sustained dissent is likely to have a significant negative impact on
the public’s perception of the Court is unclear at best.
Rather, as noted Supreme Court commentator Jeffrey Rosen
speculates, the public’s opinion of the Court is likely driven by much
more general matters, such as whether the public is pleased, in terms
of policy outcomes, with the Court’s decisions.196 For example, Rosen
argues that high-profile, politically contentious cases—such as Bush v.
Gore,197 Kelo v. City of New London,198 Boumediene v. Bush,199 and even
Citizens United—caused public angst “by increasing the perception
among half the public that the Court is out of step with its partisan
preferences.”200 Indeed, the Supreme Court often finds itself as the
192 See id.; see also David Frum, Don’t Take it Personally Your Honors: They’re Mad at
Everybody, THE DAILY BEAST (June 8, 2012, 11:58 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2012/06/08/supreme-court.html (explaining that confidence in many American institutions has decreased significantly).
193 See supra notes 139–141 and accompanying text.
194 C-SPAN, SUPREME COURT SURVEY (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.cspan.org/pdf/2010SCOTUS_poll.pdf.
195 FindLaw Survey: Most Americans Can’t Name Supreme Court Justices, FINDLAW (Aug. 23, 2012, 12:02 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/official_findlaw_blog/
2012/08/findlaw-survey-most-americans-cant-name-supreme-court-justices.html.
Chief Justice Roberts was the most well-known, recognized by only 20% of respondents. Id.
196 Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court Has a Legitimacy Crisis, But Not for the Reason
You Think, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 11, 2012), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/
103987/the-supreme-court-has-legitimacy-crisis-not-the-reason-you-think#. “Americans support the Court when they perceive themselves to be in partisan agreement
with it, and they lose confidence when they perceive the [J]ustices to be moving in a
different partisan direction than their own.” Id.
197 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
198 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
199 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
200 Rosen, supra note 196. Under this theory, were the Court to decide two cases
on the same day, one extremely troubling to Democrats and the other extremely
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final arbiter of this country’s most divisive political disputes. This is all
to say that, in terms of affecting the long-term institutional legitimacy
of the Court, the public is much less likely to be influenced by obscure
jurisprudential practices than it is by the Court’s arriving at outcomes
it perceives as correct.201 This creates the obvious problem that the
public, in large part, does not always agree about what the “correct”
outcome of a case should be. So what can the Court do to preserve its
legitimacy?
As Justice Scalia presaged in Casey, “[i]nstead of engaging in the
hopeless task of predicting public perception . . . the Justices should
do what is legally right . . . .”202 In the same case, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Court “derives its legitimacy, not from following
public opinion, but from deciding by its best lights whether [laws]
comport with the Constitution.”203 Sustained dissent can play a valuable role in the legitimacy enhancing endeavor by giving the Court the
opportunity to more thoroughly consider the case, particularly as
applied to different factual scenarios, and by decreasing the likelihood that the Court will simply be compelled to reaffirm a prior
incorrect decision. This more thorough, prolonged analysis would
improve the Court’s decisions, and could render them more reliable
and respected in the long run. Thus, if properly—but not excessively—restrained, sustained dissent can improve the Court’s image.
In Casey, the Chief Justice acknowledged this, stating that the Court
can “enhance[ ] its stature by acknowledging and correcting its
error.”204 Chief Justice Roberts echoed this sentiment in Citizens
United.205 Indeed, many scholars agree that one of the Court’s most
legitimate, respected, relied upon cases is Brown v. Board of Education,
a case where the Court questioned and ultimately repudiated one of
troubling to Republicans, both parties would be dismayed by the Court, despite the
fact that Court’s decisions would not, in the aggregate, favor one party over the other.
201 Id. (“[T]he most straightforward way for the Court to maintain its high
approval ratings is to hand down decisions that majorities of the public agree with.”).
202 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. . v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
203 Id. at 963 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
204 Id. at 959.
205 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920–21 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). In his concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts recognized that the doctrine of stare
decisis is not an end in itself, but rather is intended to serve the greater interests of
institutional legitimacy and promotion of the rule of law. Id. In those situations
where adhering to the doctrine will “do[ ] more to damage this constitutional ideal
than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent.” Id. at
921.
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its prior holdings.206 While Brown was not an instance of sustained
dissent, a Justice who may have chosen to sustain in dissent from Plessy
v. Ferguson207 would certainly have been vindicated.
Moreover, sustained dissent can enhance public confidence by
giving individuals the peace of mind that, despite their disappointment with a particular decision, they still have a voice on the Court
representing their views, not yet ready to give up the fight.208 Justices
Brennan and Marshall undoubtedly inspired and gave hope to the
anti-death penalty movement in the wake of Gregg v. Georgia.209
Indeed, in 1994, the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty
launched the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Project, dedicated to
informing the public about failures of the death penalty.210
While much of the “legitimacy enhancing” argument developed
above is not unique to sustained dissent specifically, the practice falls
within a broader jurisprudential approach that seeks to improve the
public’s perception of the Court by recognizing that the doctrine of
stare decisis is merely “an adjunct”211 of a greater duty. Blind adherence to past mistakes, purely out of respect for the doctrine, is in
many circumstances an abdication of the fundamental judicial responsibility to faithfully interpret the Constitution.212 Therefore, while the
206 See, e.g., Amar & Amar, supra note 185; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 920
(2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging that abandoning precedent has
led to significant social goods, such as desegregation and the enactment of minimum
wage laws).
207 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
208 See Lani Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50 (2008)
(“By illuminating an alternative view of the law, [a dissenter] can . . . inspire a sense of
agency among the people themselves.”). This article discusses how, for instance, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg have used their dissents to give minority viewpoints “enduring traction” in such a way that gives the public “more confidence in the lawmaking
institutions and in their own ability to influence those institutions, and thus a greater
sense of agency.” Id. at 117–18.
209 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
210 See Susan Blaustein, Justice Brennan Holds Court, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 12,
1994, at 48, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/1994/12/12/1994_12_
12_048_TNY_CARDS_000369167; see also Linda Greenhouse, Liberal Giants Inspire
Three Centrist Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/1992/10/25/us/liberal-giants-inspire-three-centrist-justices.html?pagewanted=
all&src=pm. “By the end of careers in the law spanning six decades, Justices William J.
Brennan Jr. and Thurgood Marshall had inspired generations of lawyers with their
view of the law as an instrument of social and political change.” Id.
211 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 963 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also supra note
205 and accompanying text.
212 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–80 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . . This is
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simple fact that a Justice may engage in the practice is unlikely to
harm the Court’s legitimacy, to the extent the practice can be used as
a means to improve judicial decisions, it could result in improved public confidence in the Court.
In sum, it is a tenuous proposition that sustained dissent will lead
to the negative consequences feared in Part II. Instead of harming
the substantive doctrine at issue in a particular case, sustained dissent
can actually improve and clarify doctrine by continuing to test the
majority’s reasoning and by refusing to muddy the doctrinal waters
with opinions that purport to apply precedent, but fail to do so faithfully. Similarly, while reliance interests are important for the Court,
sustained dissent should not be dismissed purely out of concern for
reliance. As an initial matter, there is no empirical evidence that sustained dissent harms reliance interests; further, sustained dissent
could actually improve reliance on the Court’s decisions to the extent
those decisions are seen as the product of a more thorough, well contested debate. And finally, given the public’s lack of close attention to
the Court, it is unlikely that engaging in a practice as obscure as sustained dissent will lead to an erosion of the public’s confidence. But,
if properly focused, sustained dissent could lead to better, more reliable judicial decisions, and could signify an unwillingness to cling to
prior erroneous precedent, perhaps enhancing the Court’s legitimacy. Either way, there are important trade-offs at play here. While
overindulgence in the practice could be harmful to the Court in the
long-term, Justices should not place excessive limitations on their use
of sustained dissent, and should not restrict its employment merely to
occasions of judicial civil disobedience.
B. The Hidden Value of Sustained Dissent –
Extending the Deliberative Process
The potential benefits discussed in Part III.A—clearer doctrine,
greater reliance, and improved legitimacy—are not all that sustained
dissent can offer. One potential benefit of sustained dissent that has
not been explored by the existing literature is the potential for an
“extended deliberative process,”213 which can improve the quality of
of the very essence of judicial duty. . . . It is also not entirely unworthy of observation,
that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned . . . . [C]ourts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.”).
213 In a 2003 article discussing collegiality on the bench, D.C. Circuit Judge Harry
Edwards described the “deliberative process” as when “judges go back and forth in
their deliberations over disputed and difficult issues until agreement is reached. . . .
[J]udges participate as equals in the deliberative process—each judicial voice carries
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judicial decisions by exposing Justices to different factual contexts and
mitigating cognitive biases and various other limitations. The benefits
conferred by an extended deliberative process, however, are not absolute, and will not always outweigh the institutional costs that sustained
dissent can impose. Therefore, the practice must be restrained so that
its employment creates value for the legal community and does not
endanger the doctrine of stare decisis.
By engaging in sustained dissent, a Justice extends the deliberative process; that is, he stretches his consideration of a complex legal
issue over a series of cases, refusing to fall in line with the majority
after the initial case. Instead of merely accepting as binding a precedent he or she believes to be erroneous, and limiting his or her consideration of the present case accordingly, a Justice (or group of
Justices) who extends the deliberative process will continue to test the
precedent against a new set of facts, and with the benefit of information on how lower courts have implemented it and academic commentary about the decision. In other words, a case would not become
“settled precedent” immediately upon its decision, but rather would
be subject to criticism and theory testing for an extended period of
time. In theory, the extended deliberative process will lead to better,
more well-informed judicial decisions.214 Armed with better information and different facts, the Justices would be able to craft a rule that
fits a wider array of cases or that addresses concerns that may not have
appeared at first blush. Importantly, this is not just another way of
explaining how the Court modifies and contours a rule over time,
though that is an important part of the process. Rather, the extended
deliberative process encourages a more fundamental reconsideration
of the precedent. While not every instance of sustained dissent will
embody this principle,215 those focused on reconsidering and improvweight, because each judge is willing to hear and respond to differing positions.”
Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1639, 1646 (2003). This article will develop the concept of the “extended deliberative process,” whereby the process Judge Edwards describes is extended over a number of cases.
214 This concept is distinct from the concept discussed in Part III.A—that sustained dissent can lead to clearer, more coherent decisions. Instead, the extended
deliberative process could theoretically lead to better, more “correct” decisions. In
other words, greater clarity and coherence help one to discover precisely what the
Court is saying, which has significant benefits. The extended deliberative process
goes beyond this, however, by producing more well-informed, higher quality decisions, which lead to better outcomes.
215 Consider, for example, Justices Brennan’s and Marshall’s sustained dissent
from affirming the constitutionality of the death penalty in the line of cases beginning
with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). There was typically no reconsideration of
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ing legal rules can extend and enrich deliberation, leading to better
judicial decisions.
The idea that an extended deliberative process can improve judicial decisions rests on the notion that the one-case method of adjudication has significant flaws. In a 2012 case before the Ninth Circuit,
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski wrote: “Bad facts make bad law. No facts
make worse law.”216 This observation succinctly embodies two fundamental aspects of our system of adjudication: it recognizes that a legal
dispute must be decided within the framework of a case, while at the
same time acknowledging that a single case can be inherently an
imperfect context within which to settle complex and difficult legal
questions. Indeed, it is a “hallmark of the common law” that the resolution of concrete disputes is the preferred method by which to make
law.217 A first-year course in Constitutional Law similarly demonstrates that such an approach, while compelled by the Constitution,218
also promotes the separation of powers and a restrained judiciary.219
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that there are inherent limitations with this approach: “cases may produce inferior law whenever
the concrete case is nonrepresentative of the full array of events that
the ensuing rule or principle will encompass.”220 And it is not only
the extraordinary or unique case that may bring about this distortion;
the issues; simply an adherence to the views they had expressed in earlier dissents. See
generally Ronald J. Tabak, Justice Brennan and the Death Penalty, 11 PACE L. REV. 473
(1991) (discussing Justice Brennan’s death penalty jurisprudence, including his many
dissents in post-Gregg cases).
216 Emeldi v. Univ. of Or., 698 F.3d 715, 718 (9th Cir. 2012) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the order denying the petition for rehearing en banc); cf. N. Secs. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Great cases like
hard cases make bad law.”).
217 Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 883 (2006);
see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 212 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) (“It is the merit
of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards.”). Notice that, like Judge Kozinski, Justice Holmes recognized both the value
in case-based lawmaking as well as its imperfections. See Schauer, supra at 884–85.
218 The Constitution “limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ . . . .” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
219 See, e.g., William R. Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices’ Most Significant Opinion, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 173, 185–87 (2002) (describing how the early Court’s rejection of advisory opinions was motivated by a desire to respect the separation of
powers). “In a letter addressed to the President, [the Justices] wrote that they were
specifically concerned about maintaining the ‘[l]ines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments of Government . . . .’ ” Id. at 184–85.
220 Schauer, supra note 217, at 884.
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an ordinary case may present certain facts or issues that unduly impact
the way a judge considers and decides a legal question.221
For instance, social science research suggests that the one case
approach to adjudication may have a distorting effect on the outcome
of a legal rule or principle due to unrealized cognitive limitations.222
When judges are “mesmerized by the case before them,” they will
attach too much weight to the facts of that case in assessing the proper
legal outcome, leading to suboptimal decisions.223 This is called the
“availability bias.”224 An example of the availability bias, raised by
Frederick Schauer, is the case of Katzenbach v. McClung.225 In
McClung, the issue was whether Congress had authority under the
Commerce Clause to enact the portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
that outlawed racial discrimination by restaurants who served food
that had moved in interstate commerce.226 Despite acknowledging
the “absence of evidence connecting discriminatory restaurant service
with the flow of interstate food,” the Court upheld the Act as valid,
stating that private discrimination by local actors was “a national commercial problem of the first magnitude.”227 With its companion case,
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,228 McClung marked a significant
expansion of the Commerce Clause, giving Congress the power to use
the clause to regulate social concerns as opposed to primarily economic ones.229 According to Schauer, “the pressing nature of the
desegregation concerns presented in the . . . case may well have
221 Id. at 885.
222 Id. at 918; see also Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking and the Limits of
Perception: Mitigating Implicit Bias with Judicial Empathy, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164325 (“Cognitive science has revealed that decisions that we believe to be based on careful, neutral,
logical reasoning may actually be guided by implicit biases and unexamined
frameworks of thinking.”).
223 Schauer, supra note 217, at 894.
224 Id. at 894–95 (“This phenomenon of being overinfluenced by proximate examples is commonly called, in the heuristics and biases literature, the ‘availability
heuristic.’ ”).
225 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
226 See id. at 298–99.
227 Id. at 304–05.
228 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
229 See, e.g., Heather Hale, Note, United States v. Lopez: Resisting Further Expansion
of Congressional Authority Under the Commerce Power, 1996 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV.
99, 108–09 (1996) (noting the effect of The Civil Rights Act cases on Commerce
Clause jurisprudence); James M. Maloney, Note, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress:
The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1795, 1813 (1994) (discussing the impact of The Civil Rights Act cases).
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helped produce doctrinal extensions . . . that very likely would not
otherwise have come to pass.”230
Even worse, if the availability bias manifests itself early in a rule’s
doctrinal development, such an error could send the doctrine down
an errant road, never to return.231 A possible example of this is
Osborn v. Bank of United States.232 Osborn was the first case to construe
the breadth of Article III’s arising under jurisdiction and still stands
for the proposition that such jurisdiction is quite broad.233 However,
the decision has been criticized as having been motivated less by legal
reasoning and more by the facts of the particular case—that is, Chief
Justice Marshall felt that federal court jurisdiction of cases involving
the Bank of the United States was extremely important to the country’s progress, and thus his ability to reason impartially was so
affected.234 While such criticism may be unwarranted, and while it is
unclear that the holding in Osborn would ultimately have been different had the case been decided in a different factual context, it must
be acknowledged that the facts of a case, while not always perfectly
representative, nevertheless have a significant impact on its outcome
and the resulting rule.
Another mental bias, the effect of which is amplified by the one
case method of adjudication and could be mitigated by sustained dissent, is the “anchoring effect.” When a Justice “anchors,” his assessment of the present case is largely determined according to his
230 Schauer, supra note 217, at 902. The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
equal protection restricts only state action; these cases, however, extended Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit local discrimination by private actors—
a significant expansion. See GREGORY E. MAGGS & PETER J. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 163 (2d ed. 2011).
231 But see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 903, 905 (2005) (“[P]recedent exerts more path dependency in constitutional law than social scientists acknowledge, but less path dependency than legal
scholars presume.”).
232 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
233 Id. at 823 (“[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the
power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause . . . .”).
234 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
481 (1957) (“Marshall’s holding was undoubtedly influenced by his fear that the bank
might suffer hostile treatment in the state courts . . . .”); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III
and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 812 (2004) (“Scholars and judges have
explained the unbounded logic of Osborn . . . as part of a mere political decision that
was necessary at the time to protect the federal bank from interference by the
States.”). But see id. at 813 (“That a judicial result is politically expedient does not
render the reasoning that led to it ‘political’ and therefore unworthy of serious
consideration.”).
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understanding of the prior case; the Justice attaches too much weight
to the prior case, and indeed confines his assessment of the present
case to the logical framework created by the prior case.235 In other
words, the prior case frames the issue in such a way that it becomes
difficult for the Justice to consider the present case from a different
perspective.236 This, of course, leads to a suboptimal system of
assigning constitutional importance to cases—“first in time, first in
right.”237 Regardless of the specific bias at issue, whether conscious or
unconscious,238 the salient point is that sustained dissent can mitigate
these concerns by extending the deliberative process into different
factual scenarios. If even a single Justice refuses to accept a precedent
with which he disagrees, and continues to dissent in future cases, such
behavior can extend the deliberative process in a way that mitigates
the effect of bias or other cognitive limitations, introduces varied factual contexts, and ultimately leads to truer, more representative
opinions.
In advocating for a more favorable view of sustained dissent,
one’s argument need not be hostile to the system of precedent or in
favor of discarding the doctrine of stare decisis. To the contrary, in
recognizing the importance of the doctrine, advocates of sustained
dissent seek to ensure that only those cases truly worthy of being
accorded great precedential respect reach that stature. An extended
deliberative process makes a case’s journey to “respected precedent” a
much more difficult one to complete. Precedent that fails to run the
extended gauntlet would benefit from reconsideration and further
debate, and should emerge with a clearer, sturdier rule. Precedent
that survives the extended debate will be battle tested and can display
its durability. In either case, the resulting precedent should be
clearer, able to stimulate greater reliance, and indicative of a legitimate Court, but also of higher quality and more likely to be substantively correct.
C. Striking the Appropriate Balance
As acknowledged above, however, the benefits conferred by an
extended deliberative process will not always outweigh the institu235 Schauer, supra note 217, at 896–97.
236 Id. at 897–98.
237 This is not to suggest that we should not accord respect to prior cases; it is to
suggest that we should not unnecessarily foreclose reconsideration of the doctrinal
frameworks that prior cases have established simply because the prior cases came first.
238 There is evidence that these biases impact the decisionmaker even if he is
aware of them. Such biases are resistant to “awareness-based debiasing techniques.”
Schauer, supra note 217, at 897.
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tional costs imposed by its employment. To provide an extreme illustration, were a modern Justice to dissent from any case that upholds
the constitutionality of paper money,239 such a dissent would provide
very little benefit to the Court’s constitutional law jurisprudence, and
would serve only to raise questions about the practicality of the
Court.240 So how can a Justice determine when engaging in sustained
dissent is a worthwhile endeavor? What are the necessary restraints
that must be imposed to ensure that the costs of engaging in the practice do not outweigh the benefits?
For the most part, this calculation will involve balancing the factors discussed in Part I.C—the nature of the case, the age of the precedent, and the strength of the precedent. For instance, Justices should
only sustain their dissent in constitutional cases. While one must
admit that a gridlocked or otherwise ineffective Congress will not
always, in fact, be able to correct what it perceives as the Court’s misinterpretation of a statute, respect for Congress’s institutional role counsels against sustained dissent in statutory cases. After all, the
Constitution gives Congress primary authority to shape policy through
statutory law.241 Once the Court interprets a statute, a Justice should
leave disagreement with and correction of an erroneous construction
to Congress. In attempting to properly focus employment of the practice so as not to incur undue cost, confining sustained dissent to issues
of constitutional interpretation is a wise first step.
In addition, Justices should confine their use of the practice to
newly minted precedent. This is because, as Justice Scalia properly
observed in his dissent in Gathers, “the respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather than decreases . . . as the society adjusts itself to
their existence, and the surrounding law becomes premised upon
their validity.”242 Thus, subjecting long-standing, well-entrenched precedent to sustained dissent would most squarely implicate reliance
239 The constitutionality of paper money was ultimately affirmed in 1884. See Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
240 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, Paper Money and the Original Understanding of the
Coinage Clause, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1017, 1019–20 (2009) (recognizing that
even those legal scholars who argue that the holdings of the Legal Tender Cases were
incorrect as an original matter nonetheless acknowledge the impracticality of overturning those cases). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution
(and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2061 n.46 (2006) (arguing that, were the Court
to overturn the Legal Tender Cases, Congress would still be able to establish a paper
money system as necessary and proper to its authority to coin money and regulate
interstate commerce).
241 See Barrett, supra note 186.
242 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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concerns, and could impose significant institutional costs.243 There is
no particular length of time whereby a precedent magically becomes
immune from sustained dissent; this will require a prudential consideration on the part of the Justice. Erring on the side of caution, however, is advisable. A seismic shift in the legal landscape should be left
to the people’s elected representatives.244 Conversely, a quick self-correction does not pose the same degree of threat, either to reliance or
legitimacy.245 Where the Court is viewed as overturning a landmark
case, or a case that has spawned the reliance of an entire generation,
costs are substantially higher.246 In a sense, it is ideal for a Justice to
commence a sustained dissent at the first opportunity given, putting
the precedent—and those who may seek to rely on it—on notice as
soon as possible. By exempting long-standing precedents from the
crosshairs of sustained dissent, and by commencing the practice as
early as possible, a Justice can mitigate reliance and legitimacy concerns, and maximize the benefits of the extended deliberative process.
Similarly, Justices should refrain from employing the practice to
challenge especially strong precedent. This is not determined by simply tallying the “score” of the precedential case; as stated above, sustained dissent can still have value in the context of an eight-to-one
decision. This evaluation would certainly account for the number of
Justices in the majority, but also the persistence of the majority, the
age of the precedent, whether there is new personnel on the Court,
and whether actions by the States are calling into question the legitimacy of the precedent, etc. For instance, it could be argued that Justice Thomas’s continued dissent from the “substantial effects” test of
United States v. Darby247 and Wickard v. Filburn248 is somewhat overzealous.249 The test currently has the support of seven, perhaps eight,
members of the Court,250 with no indication by any other member of
243 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 750 (1988) (“To permit or vindicate challenges to these traditions would ‘incite radical and even revolutionary attacks on the legal status quo.’ ”).
244 See Joel Alicea, Note, Stare Decisis in an Originalist Congress, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 797, 808 (2012).
245 See Kelman, supra note 16, at 236.
246 See id.
247 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
248 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
249 “I adhere to my view ‘the very notion of a “substantial effects” test under the
Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases.’ ” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
250 For an example of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan applying
the test, see Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in
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an intention to overrule it; indeed, it has stood as precedent since the
early 1940s, and there has been no significant political push to nominate Justices who oppose the test.251 In other words, it appears that
the “substantial effects” test is beyond judicial correction252 and that
Justice Thomas’s insistence on opposing it offers little jurisprudential
value but imposes institutional costs. By contrast, the recent pronouncement by five Justices in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius253 that Congress may only utilize its authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate existing economic activity254 is a
more vulnerable precedent; it has the support of a bare majority of
the Court (who did not join the same opinion) and is a much more
recent decision. Sustaining dissent from this rule should result in less
institutional costs than dissenting from application of the “substantial
effects” test. Ultimately, in the interest of picking battles wisely and
not using sustained dissent in such a way that a Justice weakens a longstanding, sturdy precedent (one that neither the people nor their
elected representatives have challenged in any meaningful way), a Justice should confine his sustained dissent to issues that are still “open
for debate”—issues that will benefit from the extended deliberative
process.
In sum, use of the practice should be restrained to newly minted
constitutional cases that, by their very nature, do not connote finality,
but rather beckon for further discovery and debate. Doing so will
help to ensure that the benefits of the extended deliberative process
and other advantages conferred by sustained dissent outweigh the
institutional costs imposed by the practice. Importantly, if confined to
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). For an example of Justice Kennedy
complying in the application of the test, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
For an example of Justice Scalia applying the test, in conjunction with the Necessary
& Proper Clause, see Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). For an
example of Chief Justice Roberts applying the test, see Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578
(2012). Indeed, no other Justice joined Justice Thomas’s solo dissent in Sebelius
rejecting the validity of the “substantial effects” test.
251 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555–56 (1995) (referring to
Darby, which created the substantial effects test, and Wickard, which affirmed and
built upon the test, as “modern-era precedents”).
252 Efforts at limiting or eliminating the test, well-reasoned and legitimate, are best
directed at the political branches, either by communicating to Congress that it should
no longer utilize such power, or by urging constitutional amendment. Congress is
equipped to handle such a transition prospectively—a strategy typically not available
to the judiciary—which would minimize the costs of disruption to reliance.
253 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
254 Id. at 2591 (“The individual mandate forces individuals into commerce precisely because they elected to refrain from commercial activity. Such a law cannot be
sustained under a clause authorizing Congress to ‘regulate Commerce.’ ”).
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such situations, sustained dissent is not necessarily inconsistent with a
desire for judicial restraint. While judicial restraint can be defined,
rather simply, as the practice of adhering to precedent and promoting
predictability255—a definition unkind to sustained dissent—other
important characteristics animate judicial restraint as well. Such characteristics include deference to the political branches, reducing the
role of the courts in the governing process, and preventing a judge
from writing his personal political views into his decisions—collectively referred to as “structural restraint” by Judge Richard Posner.256
With these characteristics in mind, sustained dissent accords quite
well with judicial restraint; there is no reason that engaging in the
practice would require violating any of the principles stated above. In
fact, a sustained dissent could promote restraint by continually warning the majority that its decision has usurped authority from one of
the coordinate branches, or has unwisely amplified the role of the
Court.257 Likewise, it could promote predictability and stability in the
long run by producing sturdier, more reliable precedents. Simply
because sustained dissent involves a Justice’s refusal to adhere to precedent does not necessarily mean that engaging in the practice is
inconsistent with a restrained judiciary; indeed, if confined in the
manner described above, sustained dissent can serve to promote judicial restraint.
D. Assessing the Various Justifications for Sustained Dissent
Having responded to the potential negative consequences and
highlighted the countervailing interests at play, and with the additional insight provided by a thorough examination of the extended
deliberative process, what conclusions can be drawn about the appropriateness of sustained dissent? Which justifications are legitimate, in
that they promote better judicial decisions, maximize the benefits of
sustained dissent, and minimize institutional costs? Conversely, which
255 See Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 273–77 (2005) (“[A]dopting a strong theory of
precedent . . . would promote judicial restraint. . . . In sum, judicial restraint means
judicial predictability.”).
256 Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 11–12
(1983).
257 Cf. Barrett, supra note 186, at 1063 (“Even if, for the sake of reliance, we are
willing to tolerate [erroneous interpretations of the Constitution], a broad incursion
would intolerably shift the balance between the judicial power and its counterweights.
A broad power to trump constitutional text with erroneous gloss would remove the
line between judicial interpretation and constitutional amendment.”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL404.txt

1984

unknown

Seq: 46

notre dame law review

22-APR-13

11:08

[vol. 88:4

instances of sustained dissent can be dismissed as misguided and ultimately counterproductive?
The personal justification for sustaining dissent is unsatisfactory.
Whether motivated by stern convictions—“Here, I draw the line”—or
by a desire to keep one’s judicial decisions internally consistent—the
so-called “self stare decisis”—the typical sustained dissent for personal
reasons fails to generate benefits that outweigh its costs. The benefits
are not significant because the dissent does not extend the deliberative process by bringing new facts or arguments to light; it merely
restates a well-informed but fundamental disagreement, or represents
an unyielding commitment to one’s own judicial philosophy. In addition, the costs are substantial, because a personally motivated sustained dissent knows no principled bounds—the type, age, or strength
of the precedent is unlikely to limit or restrain a dissent whose motivations transcend such factors. The paradigmatic example of Justices
Brennan and Marshall is a good example of this; their sustained dissent lasted their entire careers, but arguably failed to make a substantial impact. Acknowledging that morality is an essential aspect of the
law,258 that the Constitution has an inherent moral component,259
and that a Justice’s sense of morality can properly inform an initial
dissent, the Justice’s role—in all but the most extraordinary circumstances260—is not to perpetually attempt to give effect to his own
morality, or to vindicate his own prior line of reasoning. Ultimately,
deeply entrenched moral disagreements are unlikely to be resolved in
the context of the Court’s operations, and to allow such disagreements to weigh down the Court would be to improperly utilize the
sustained dissent. Thus, the sustained dissent for personal reasons
generally does not accord well with the principles laid out in this
Note.
The benefits associated with sustained dissent, including the
extended deliberative process, are more consistent with the institutional and strategic justifications. The institutional justification provides initial support for the practice—that Justices of the Court are
bound by a fundamental duty to faithfully interpret the Constitution
and not the gloss that an earlier Court may have put on it.261 The
strategic justification restrains the use of the practice in a meaningful
way, limiting the practice to only those recently decided, hotly con258 See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011).
259 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
260 See, e.g., supra notes 206–207.
261 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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tested cases that have not yet reached protected status and would benefit from the extended deliberative process. And finally, a more
nuanced approach to the institutional justification provides guidance
on when a sustained dissent should be abandoned; in this sense, the
Justice is not simply an institutional crusader, disregarding all practical concerns in the name of “getting it right,” but instead recognizes
the countervailing institutional interests and understands that his fundamental institutional role cannot be served if the Court is, or is perceived to be, merely a third political branch.262 Thus, while the
sustained dissent for personal reasons will not typically produce a net
benefit, a sustained dissent that incorporates both strategic and institutional concerns is more likely to produce better judicial decisions in
the long run.
Before turning back to Citizens United, it is worth revisiting the
“cold storage” alternative preferred by Larsen and Kelman to determine how it accords with the values and principles laid out in Part III.
Those who advocate the “cold storage” option—whereby a Justice
explains his disagreement with the precedent in a concurrence, but
applies the precedent faithfully until he has assembled enough support to reconsider and perhaps overturn it—assert that it is the more
restrained, proper alternative to sustained dissent; that, by “concurring under duress,” a Justice can avoid incurring substantial institutional costs.263 However, this is not necessarily the case—“cold
storage” is a practice to be avoided. Operating under the false sense
of security that this alternative imposes little or no institutional costs,
advocates of “cold storage” have not laid out any principled limits on
its employment.264 Indeed, excessive use of “cold storage” would
impose many of the same costs that excessive use of sustained dissent
imposes—a Justice’s continued disagreement with precedent, whether
in a dissent or a concurrence, raises many of the same reliance and
legitimacy concerns discussed above. Further, legitimacy concerns
may be heightened if a Justice openly declares his disagreement with
the precedent, but applies it nonetheless. And without any principled
limits restraining its employment or counseling its demise, there is no
telling what the ultimate cost of the “cold storage” approach will be.
Indeed, what if the counter majority is never assembled and the
opportunity to overturn the precedent never arises?
262 See Hellman, supra note 139.
263 See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text.
264 See Kelman, supra note 16, at 230–31, 258–74, 297–98. In these passages, Kelman discusses, and ultimately advocates, the “cold storage” alternative to sustained
dissent, but offers no significant restraints on its use.
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Instead, continued disagreement with precedent should be channeled into a robust, properly focused sustained dissent. This Note
openly acknowledges that sustained dissent imposes some institutional
costs. Such an acknowledgement requires a careful balancing of the
costs and benefits, ensuring that the practice remains limited in its
application. If a Justice adheres to the limitations discussed above, the
sustained dissent will only be used in appropriate cases, will remain
temporally limited, and will allow the Justice to register his continued
disagreement in a productive manner. Thus, the “cold storage”
option is inconsistent with the necessary limitations and restraints
advocated in this Note; the robust, properly focused sustained dissent
is the preferable option.
IV. IS SUSTAINED DISSENT

FROM

CITIZENS UNITED JUSTIFIED?

Justice Breyer’s dissent in American Tradition Partnership suggests
that he and the other three Justices intend to sustain their dissent
from Citizens United. Justice Breyer essentially revealed his strategic
motivations in his dissent.265 Indeed, all the factors associated with
the strategic dissent are present: Citizens United was a divisive five-tofour decision in a constitutional case from only two years prior.266
Further, the minority’s dissent is chiefly based on what it perceives to
be a faulty factual assertion relied upon by the Citizens United majority—that independent corporate political expenditures do not lead to
corruption or the appearance thereof.267 In short, the Justices disagreed with the holding of Citizens United and explicitly rejected its
validity in American Tradition Partnership. Whether, or for how long,
such a dissent may continue is an interesting question. For purposes
of this Note, however, it is sufficient simply to acknowledge that the
seeds have been planted. The more important question is whether, in
this context, Justice Breyer and those who joined him are justified in
continuing to dissent from Citizens United and when any possible justification may subside.
The critical view presented in Part II would likely not support the
Justices’ decision to sustain their dissent from Citizens United. Those
scholars who take an exceptionally limited view of the practice—who
reserve its application only as a form of judicial civil disobedience—
would likely find any justification lacking. For instance, Kelman
265 Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2492 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Were the matter up to me, I would vote to grant the petition for certiorari in order to reconsider Citizens United or, at least, its application in this case.”).
266 See id. at 2490–92.
267 See id. at 2491.
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argues that the notion “I still think I am right and my colleagues are
wrong” is an insufficient justification for engaging in the practice;268
that is precisely what Justice Breyer did in this case.269 Similarly, there
does not appear to be anything “truly extraordinary”270 about Citizens
United that would convince Larsen that sustained dissent from that
case is appropriate. Certainly the case has taken on a high profile
since it was decided, but the Court hands down many five-to-four decisions on issues of great public import each term. It does not appear
that the criteria offered for when sustained dissent is permitted as a
means of judicial civil disobedience has been met. Instead, those with
a critical view of sustained dissent would likely urge the four Justices to
place their dissent in “cold storage,” advertising their disagreement
with Citizens United in a concurring opinion, but accepting and applying it until they have garnered the necessary fifth vote to overturn it.
Considering the dissent in light of the more favorable view
presented in Part III, sustained dissent from Citizens United may be
justified; it fits neatly into the framework of when engaging in the
practice is appropriate. Recall from Part III that use of the practice
should be restrained to newly minted constitutional cases that, by
their very nature, do not connote finality, but rather beckon for further discovery and debate. This is an apt description of Citizens
United;271 it is precisely the kind of case that could benefit from the
extended deliberative process. Had the Court been forced to confront in a meaningful way the Montana Supreme Court’s finding that
independent corporate political expenditures lead to corruption and
the appearance of corruption in Montana, particularly given the
unique and varied histories of the several states, perhaps the Court
would have seen the issue differently, or perhaps qualified the holding
somewhat. Additional data or argument could have helped the Court
to reconsider or reframe the issue in Citizens United. While the central
holding likely would have remained, and perhaps rightly so, further
268 Kelman, supra note 16, at 297.
269 See Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491 (“I disagree with the Court’s holding
in [Citizens United] . . . .”).
270 Larsen, supra note 16, at 476.
271 In addition to the case having been decided by a five-to-four margin only two
years prior, the decision has received substantial criticism from the public and twentytwo states joined Montana in asking the Supreme Court to uphold the state’s ban on
independent corporate political expenditures. See Unlimited Campaign Spending Gets
Thumbs Down in Polls, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (July 18, 2012), http://www.first
amendmentcenter.org/unlimited-campaign-spending-gets-thumbs-down-in-poll;
Katrina vanden Heuvel, Resolve to Overturn ‘Citizens United’ Spreads Through the States,
THE NATION (June 12, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/blog/168346/resolve-over
turn-citizens-united-spreads-through-states#.
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deliberation and debate may have prompted the majority to look
more favorably on the state’s interest in preventing corruption. As
cautioned above in Part III, perpetual dissent would not be justified; at
a certain point, the costs of the minority’s persistence in dissent would
come to outweigh any possible benefits. For instance, if Citizens United
weathers the storm of sustained dissent unscathed, an entire generation comes to rely on its validity, and there is no serious change in the
public’s sensibilities suggesting the issue should be revisited, continually dissenting would likely impose costs that outweigh the minimal
benefits in this situation. But a properly focused, temporally limited,
robust sustained dissent could prove to be fruitful in the context at
issue.
In fact, it could be argued that the four dissenting Justices should
have voted to grant certiorari and used the strength of the factual
record in American Tradition Partnership to advance its cause.272 However, since the Justices voted to deny the petition for certiorari—
thereby foreclosing the opportunity for further briefing, argument,
and debate—and merely reiterated a prior dissent, this instance of
sustained dissent did not in any meaningful way extend the deliberative process. The sustained dissent in American Tradition Partnership
raised questions about the validity of Citizens United and its vulnerability to a change in personnel, and thus harmed reliance interests, but
did not significantly contribute to the doctrinal debate or help to
reframe the issue. Such a brief sustained dissent is not worthless; in
many cases the minority may consist of fewer than four Justices, and
dissent from denial of certiorari may be the best that can be accomplished. But in this context, where the four dissenting Justices could
have forced a meaningful—if ultimately unsuccessful—reconsideration of the issue, and could have truly extended the deliberative process, there was an opportunity that the dissenting Justices did not
seize. Even the more favorable view of the practice would suggest that
the sustained dissent in American Tradition Partnership left much to be
desired. Perhaps if the dissenting Justices were focused on the value
created by the extended deliberative process, and not merely on trying to serve strategic ends, they may have dissented more robustly.

272 Perry describes this practice as an “aggressive grant.” PERRY, supra note 7, at
207. Here, a Justice “reach[es] out to take a case . . . because [he has] calculated that
it has certain characteristics that would make it particularly good for developing doctrine in a certain way . . . .” Id. at 207–08.
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CONCLUSION
Though sustained dissent has become more widespread in recent
decades, it still has not garnered significant attention in academic
literature. It is perhaps better described as a concept than as a welldefined practice. Theories about the appropriateness of its employment are not as developed or as well-known as those discussing a Justice’s general approach to stare decisis, for example. And while this
Note does not definitively answer any questions surrounding the practice, it contributes to the existing scholarly debate by responding to
those who maintain a critical view of the practice, presenting a more
favorable view of the practice’s benefits, and advancing the idea of the
extended deliberative process.
There are costs to engaging in sustained dissent—chief among
them are harm to reliance on the Court’s decisions and the possibility
that excessive use of the practice could undermine the Court’s legitimacy. However, the skeptical view maintained by most scholars who
have explored the practice overstates the negative consequences.
Indeed, it is too extreme of a solution to limit the practice to only a
means of judicial civil disobedience. A middle ground exists whereby
vigorous sustained dissent can be focused in such a way that it generates benefits that outweigh its costs. Sustained dissent can mitigate
concerns associated with the one-case method of adjudication and
lead to better, clearer judicial decisions. Those decisions that survive
the extended deliberative process will garner substantial and welldeserved reliance. And if properly restrained to only a certain class of
cases, these gains can be achieved without sacrificing the Court’s legitimacy. The practice also confers benefits that have not yet been sufficiently explored, and an excessively limited approach to the practice
forecloses the realization of such benefits.
Importantly, the conclusion that sustained dissent from Citizens
United could be fruitful reflects no judgment about the merits of the
Court’s First Amendment analysis in that case. One can agree with
the reasoning and outcome of the case while still believing that its
central holding would benefit from further discussion and debate,
and that vigorous but restrained sustained dissent can play a valuable
role in the development of the doctrine. Similarly, one can condemn
the reasoning of Citizens United and recognize that sustained dissent is
beneficial—at least for a while—to challenge and limit the majority
opinion, even if in doing so the Justice is ensuring another “loss” for
his side of the debate. Principled use of the practice can improve
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“good” and “bad” decisions alike. Ultimately, the value of sustained
dissent derives as much from the resulting doctrine’s journey as it
does from its destination.

